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Past attempts to explain Greek-Turkish conflict have
been built on two underlying themes. One theme focuses on
incompatible Greek and Turkish interests while the other
identifies cultural and social differences between the two
countries as the primary causes for competition. Immediate
causes for the conflict include issues ranging from domestic
political considerations to the international setting. This
thesis examines the 1955, 1963, 1967, 1974, 1976 and 1987
Greek-Turkish crises as it questions the primacy of
underlying or immediate causes in Greek-Turkish conflict.
After examining possible reasons for the failure of past
mediations in resolving the underlying causes of the
conflict, this thesis suggests that national interests as
well as cultural realities from both sides of the Aegean
have to be considered in any mediation attempt. Immediate
causes do not seem critical for the evolution of the
conflict even though they determine the development and
outcome of particular crises. This thesis also recognizes,
that successful resolution of Greek-Turkish differences will
be of benefit not only to the two countries but to regional
stability as well (Cyprus, Balkans, Southeastern
Mediterranean) . Organizations with which the two countries






B. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 7
C. METHODOLOGY 11
D. UTILITY 18







III. BIBLIOGRAPHIC REVIEW 57
A. GENERAL 57
B. TURKISH DOMESTIC POLITICS 58
C. GREEK DOMESTIC POLITICS 67
D. BILATERAL CONTEXT 72
E. US FOREIGN POLICY 77
F. ROLE OF NATO 80
G. EU 83
H. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 85
IV. ANALYSIS 91
A. CRISIS ORIGINS 91
1. Background 91
2. Causes for the Crises 93
3. Politics and Misperception 98
4. Context of Crises 103
B. CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND MEDIATION EFFECTIVENESS 1 05
V. CONCLUSIONS 113
Vll
LIST OF REFERENCES 117
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 123
via
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Greek-Turkish conflict is seen by many as a parochial conflict with deep
historical roots, an offspring of Balkan nationalism and politics. Indeed, Greek-Turkish
relations have been marked by both antagonism and mistrust. Antagonism is the result of
conflicting national interests as they have been expressed by both sides. Mistrust is
explained by the culturally biased perceptions of the "other." If antagonism and mistrust
are considered givens in Greek-Turkish relations, so is a series of mediations undertaken
by various parties, during or after crises. This thesis reflects the two dominant
explanations for the conflict, namely the realist and cultural arguments, on the future of
the Greek-Turkish relations, based on observed crises between the two countries and their
outcomes since 1955. The selection of crises as a subject of study is based on the
assumption that in crises one can observe policy choices which display the national
interest, constrained by the structure of the international system as well as by domestic
factors. This thesis proposes that the underlying causes of the crises can be traced to a
change in the power outlook of the countries involved since the time international treaties
codified the status quo, as we know it today. This thesis also observes through the crises
of 1955, 1963, 1967, 1974, 1976 and 1987 -which are reviewed in Chapter II- that
Greek and Turkish national interests have not been consistently addressed by mediators.
Rather, they have been taken into account only if they coincided with the interests of the
mediators; otherwise they were at best nominally addressed, at worst ignored or even
suppressed. Mediation efforts have also focused historically on integration of the two
countries within a single geopolitical entity.
In the second part of the study, a cross-crisis analysis is performed to identify
continuities and discontinuities among them. On what factors can we attribute different
outcomes for similar crises? Do we observe any continuity in the way the two countries
react during crises? After the characteristics for every crisis and mediation attempt are
collected, we will have a comprehensive view of different "pictures" of the Greek-
Turkish crises and we might be able to answer the following questions: (1) What causes
crises? Should we follow Thucidides in his view of the primacy of the underlying cause
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(interests) or revise him according to Lebow who insists on the primacy of the immediate
causes for the explanation of the crisis origins? Do we observe any patterns in the
underlying causes, which support the argument that they reflect power relationships, or
do they suggest culture as the inhibiting factor for Greek-Turkish reconciliation? (2)
Does there appear to be a more successful mediation pattern among the methods used?
What is the relation of the mediators' interest to that of the contending parties?
The reviewed crises suggest the presence of different immediate and underlying
causes. The underlying cause of the Greek-Turkish conflict is a set of incompatible
interests in the Aegean and Cyprus. Those interests are defined in relation to one another
in what becomes a zero-sum competition for primacy in a volatile and complex
geopolitical region. Turkey, following its ascending regional status since 1955, has made
steady effort to revise the situation established in the region by the treaties of Laussane,
Montreux and Paris.
Beyond the existence of underlying causes of conflict in Greek-Turkish relations,
there exists a set of phenomena and processes such as crises initiations, crises
management and crises outcome which is directly related to the immediate causes of the
conflict. Immediate causes include changes in the international or regional system,
domestic politics, institutionalized perceptions of animosity, and the local balance of
power, as well as crisis-dependent politico-military considerations. The inclusion of
immediate causes becomes necessary if one attempts to explain the difference in
outcomes of crises, given the continuities in political objectives.
Therefore, competition between Greece and Turkey exists in multiple dimensions,
qualifying the "real" interest-based conflict. Cultural differences and the separate
historical developments of the respective polities have resulted in state and societal
structures that hold different values. On the other hand, both countries shared common
allies and enemies for a long time, a condition resulting in security arrangements that
brought them closer together. In reality, the history of Greek-Turkish crises seems to be
the history of competitive centrifugal national interests and centripetal alliance or
multilateral commitments. Mediation attempts have played an important role in Greek-
Turkish crises by attempting to reinforce those centripetal commitments, at least since
1955.
However, mediation has focused more on the immediate causes of the crises,
because the intended outcome of mediation attempts has been regional stability instead of
Greek-Turkish conflict management. Power mediation has been successful nonetheless,
given that rationality eventually prevailed on both sides of the Aegean. The defusing of
each crisis though did not ameliorate animosities. The underlying causes of the conflict
have been largely ignored, reflecting the ad hoc and reactive nature of all mediations.
Since 1974, and especially since 1987, the growing involvement of the European
Community (now European Union) in the conflict allows for some optimism. Political-
economic considerations may well achieve primacy over strict strategic-military ones if a
contingency model for conflict management is followed. Such a model provides for
power mediation to avoid or contain hostilities but most important is complemented by a
series of measures to resolve the deeper, underlying causes of conflictual behavior.
As a final note, we should stress the potential for failure and its implications in
managing Greek-Turkish conflict. Past crises show us the rational character of both
Greek and Turkish decision-makers. The potential for conflict escalation however,
should be related to utility calculations involving the status quo as well as to the potential
gains and losses for each country in different scenarios. Experience since 1955 shows
that both countries, when their national interest dictated, did not hesitate to confront
NATO or US policies. The future ofNATO, US Balkan and Middle Eastern policies,
and European security and foreign policy interests are more assured with a Greek-Turkish
rapprochement. The question of"how" can only be answered by a holistic view of the






Greek-Turkish relations consistently surface as a threat to regional stability in
most contemporary analyses of the Southeastern European strategic environment (Fuller
and Lesser, 1993, p.l 14, Larrabee, 1996, Constas, 1991, p.22, Huntington, 1996, p. 255).
Greek-Turkish conflict is seen by many as a parochial conflict with deep historical roots,
an offspring ofBalkan nationalism and politics. President Clinton, following the US-EU
Summit of 16 December 1996, noted common interests for the future of both countries
and a "past that bedevils them." 1 He thus epitomized American perceptions and attitudes
towards the Greek-Turkish conflict by focusing solely on a historical explanation for the
existing friction, as well as by promoting the concept of a prospective Greek-Turkish
rapprochement, apparently important for American strategic interests in the region.
However, both the descriptive historical explanation and the prescriptive strategic
outlook need to be qualified if not outright rejected. The former focuses mainly on the
cultural-subjective component ofthe conflict and ignores the existence of current as well
as historic conflicting interests —some of them regarded as vital- by both countries. The
latter does not fully address Greek and Turkish security concerns, and therefore it does
not guarantee stability. Reconciliation becomes uncertain in a strategic setting in which
1 USIA transcripts posted at Internet site: gopher://gopher.usia.gov/
1
intra-alliance cohesion is diminishing, cultural antagonisms are deepening, and the future
ofEU and NATO has not been agreed upon yet, while American foreign policy is still in
search of principles and doctrines.
Greek-Turkish relations have been marked by both antagonism and mistrust.
Antagonism is the result of conflicting national interests as they have been expressed by
both sides. Mistrust is explained by the culturally-biased perceptions of the "other."2 If
antagonism and mistrust are considered givens in Greek-Turkish relations, so is a series
of mediations undertaken by various parties, during or after crises. This thesis reflects
the two dominant explanations for the conflict, namely the realist and cultural arguments,
on the future of the Greek-Turkish relations, based on observed crises between the two
countries and their outcomes since 1955. Meinardus proposes three levels of analysis for
the Greek-Turkish conflict by distinguishing between the domestic, regional and
international dimensions (Constas, 1991, p. 157). Crises provide us with unique
opportunities to study the conflict in an integrative approach across all three levels of
analysis.
In explaining conflict among societies a set of assumptions has to be made. Is it a
natural phenomenon or an abnormality? Can we identify and analytically separate causes
for conflictual behavior? How can we best manage a conflict? Answers to those
questions a priori limit and guide our research. An overview of our "background
answers" is necessary. It is assumed that conflict is an active phenomenon in all
"Disagreement over Cyprus and the Aegean are at the basis of present hostility. Although both parties
usually formulate their claims in precise legal terms the disputes are essentially political and the issues are
often dominated by nationalistic perceptions and historically defined attitudes." (Constas, 1991, p.79)
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societies. Conflict studies by Mitchell analyze any conflict situation in three inter-related
components of conflict situation, conflict behavior and conflict attitudes (Mitchell,
1994). For our work it is important to note his integrative approach towards the
relevance of situational as well as psychological factors in a conflict. Goal
incompatibility attributed either to existing value systems or to perceptions of scarcity
matters the same, even if it has to be treated differently for successful conflict resolution.
Mitchell also observes that conflict is a dynamic phenomenon whose components do not
remain unchanged over time. Keashly and Fisher observe four stages of conflict
escalation based on both objective and subjective factors: discussion, polarization,
segregation, and destruction ( Bercovitch, 1996, p.243). The Cyprus conflict becomes a
remarkable example of this continuum. Optimists argue that the process is reversible.
Pessimists focus on the next "destruction." Dynamics of crises across time will provide
us with the concepts of stability and equilibrium: Stability portrays the quantity of
changes in a system; equilibrium characterizes their quality (Brecher and James, 1986,
p. 17). The distinction between the two is of importance to the Greek-Turkish conflict.
Short-term remedies for stability harbor long term disequilibria as the continuity of crises
suggests.
The question of immediate vs. underlying causes of a crisis has been with us since
Thucidides. It presupposes a realist perspective and the identification of national
interests. The realist perspective endows power distributions with a greater explanatory
power than personal or systemic explanations. It focuses on threats, opportunities and
balance of power concepts (Epetirida, 1996, p. 17). In the Greek-Turkish conflict, this
thesis proposes, the underlying causes of the crises can be traced to a change in the power
outlook of the countries involved since the time international treaties codified the status
quo as we know it today. The regime that the treaties of Lausanne(1923),
Montreux(1936) and Paris(1947) created -and which is still active in the Aegean- has to
accommodate Turkey, a country with aspirations beyond its context. Continuously since
1930, but especially after the 1955 London Tripartite Conference for Cyprus, Turkey has
seen its role enhanced in the area and is capitalizing on it to pursue its strategic goals
(Bacheli, 1990, p. 193).
In Balkan politics great power intervention is a common and repeating theme.
For our work intervention is seen in the broader context, as a concept which includes
actions ranging from conciliation to peacekeeping (Bercovitch, 1996, p.241). Mediation
is one of many alternatives but our case studies confirm the "power mediation" type as
the most effective, at least for diffusing Greek-Turkish crises. This thesis also observes
through the crises reviewed in Chapter II, that Greek and Turkish national interests have
not been addressed as such, but have been taken into account only if they coincided with
the interests of the mediators; otherwise they were at best nominally addressed, at worst
ignored or even suppressed. The Cold War had provided an argument in favor of
strengthening alliance cohesion against addressing national agendas. Greece in
particular, in the aftermath of a destructive civil war, had seen its forces suppressing "the
internal danger" instead of focusing on the Turkish threat (Constas, 1991, p.97). The
paternalistic nature of bilateral relations among Greece, Turkey and the US has allowed
its direct involvement in the political decision making of the two countries in order to
accommodate American security needs. A bad omen for a lasting and just US mediation
remains the difference in priorities that Greek and Turkish security agendas have with
those set by Washington. Convergence of national interests is of more importance than
legality, according to the realist perspective. Only historical analysis can provide the
necessary background for supporting the above arguments.
Mediation efforts have focused historically on integration of the two countries
within a single geopolitical entity. NATO policy towards the Greek-Turkish conflict is
the best example of such an approach. In light of the hypotheses stated above, this
approach presents us with a paradox. How can such diverse and conflicting core interests
be satisfied within the concept of solidarity normally found in allied behavior? NATO
has suffered from Greek-Turkish differences as much as it has been unable to resolve
those differences (Clarke, 1996). Many policy makers, not only in Washington but in
Athens and in Ankara as well, propose a paradigm shift that focuses on a review of threat
calculations between the countries, as stated by President Clinton in his speech at the
EU-US Summit. They are keen to suggest a set of crisis escalation and confidence-
building measures. Their assumption is that the core difference between the two
countries is a threat perception which does not realistically reflect the intentions of both
countries, since the cost of hostilities would be greater than any potential benefit. This
thesis proposes that a paradigm shift that ignores the basic differences between the two
countries, in cultural and social infrastructures and focuses only on maintaining short-
term power relationships is not creating long-term stability. As much as power can
explain "why," it still can not resolve the "how." "The recognition of intractable social
conflicts that appear to be resistant to many traditional efforts has challenged scholars
and practitioners to expand their conceptualizations of the nature of conflict to include
both objective aspects and more subjective or social-psychological elements."
(Bercovitch, 1996, p.249)
The subjective component however should not be confused with references to
tribalism. Balkan ghosts are not at work here and neither have they been in Bosnia. The
recognition of the existence oftwo societies with conflicting interests and a long history
of competition should not function as an analysis of the conflict itself. After all, interests
change, a propensity to display a "warrior culture" is not typical for both countries, and
subjective differences should be traced to different societal developments. In the volume
The Politics of Democratic Consolidation , Malefakis writes: "...How can Turkey
generally be compared to Italy when the latter eagerly accepted the printing press in the
fifteenth century while it was only grudgingly admitted to the former in the nineteenth
century?" The differences between the two countries do not arise out of a simple mistrust
but are rooted in different values and aspirations. Value differences make approaches to
reconciliation difficult to pursue. The realist argument sits on top of cultural substrata of
different assumptions about what a state, a society and a citizen are. The leaderships of
both countries do not act in vitro but rather have to cope with a cultural reality that has
roots in the Ottoman era . Crises analysis since 1955 reinforces the thesis and suggests
that any successful conflict management effort has first to provide boundaries (not all
3 The development of states and societies in the Balkan peninsula owes much of its delay to the Ottoman
era. Greece in that respect is a remarkable case which has undertaken the transition to modernity at an age
where other European countries were already beyond the second industrial revolution, only to get integrated
in the European core by the end of the 20th century
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necessarily geographical), to satisfy realistic concerns, and then to promote integration on
an issue-by-issue basis in order to provide opportunities for future detente. Again
Keashly and Fisher warn us that "focusing on either the subjective or objective aspect
exclusive of the other aspect may result in short-term or medium-term settlement, but for
long term resolution to occur both objective and subjective elements must be addressed."
(Bercovitch, 1996, p.241) At least for the medium term it seems more realistic to address
the security concerns of both countries while we provide for future approaches.
Enforcing rapprochement through a supranational or international organization,
acceptable by neither party as impartial or honest has proved ineffectual in the past.
B. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
A brief overview of the long history of encounters the two people have had is a
necessary introduction to any analysis of their behavior. Even though the scope of this
thesis does not include a narrow, historical account of events, the historical record
describes concisely both the realist and cultural components of the conflict, as well as
puts any intervention attempt into perspective. From this ordinary realization an
extraordinary debate has emerged in academic as well as policy making circles. Where
does one set the beginning of the Greek-Turkish exchanges? This question could be
viewed as the other side of the debate for the continuity of Ottoman foreign policy from
the Sultans through the modern Turkish state. Even if our thesis considers events only
since 1955, the rich experience of mostly —but not solely— conflicting exchanges
between the two people forms a historical background that should not be overlooked.
Historical events before 1955 have been used by both countries in justifying
contemporary actions or foreign policy goals. And they are not alone. The London
Times in January 1997, referring to a recent crisis in Cyprus, did not hesitate to address
the issue in terms of the "Eastern question."
The first encounter of Greek elements with Turkish tribes was recorded in 568
AD, during the reign of Byzantine Emperor Justinian II. Until 1453, the year of
Constantinople's sacking by the Ottoman Turks, relations were fluctuating from
cooperation and sometimes alliance against common enemies, to border disputes and war
with the eventual destruction of the Byzantine empire (Nicol, 1996). The subsequent
Ottoman period has left many legacies to be found in modern times as well. It is
important to note the implications of Ottoman rule to the modern Turkish and Greek
states and their foreign policies, as well as to the cultural realities and myths in both sides
of the Aegean. Many Turks, including late President Ozal, ascribe the reluctance of
Europeans to include Turkey in a united Europe in its Ottoman past and its Muslim
identity. Ahmaz, in his analysis of the modern Turkish state identifies two legacies from
the Ottoman times. The concept of the warrior leader and that of the centralized state.
Pangalos (now foreign minister of Greece) identifies the continuities of an "imperial
posture and status" as well as a deficit in the western values of legality and human rights
for the Turkish state. "Most Turkish and foreign scholars see the foundation of the
Turkish Republic as the reorganization —albeit a radical reorganization— of a remnant of
the Ottoman empire." (Mardin). Memories in Greece of the 400 year Ottoman
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occupation, on the other hand, are reinforcing a stereotype of Turkey as expansionist and
belligerent. It is also true that the Greek war for independence started the long process
which led to the rebirth of the "sick man of Europe" in the modern Turkish state.
However, it is an historical fact that Greeks from Constantinople were influential in
Ottoman foreign policy, and that under the millet system Orthodox Christians were
receiving a degree of controlled and unwarranted autonomy.
The nationalism of the 19th century, a product of the French revolution and
Enlightenment, was the driving force in the creation of both the modern Greek and
Turkish states. After its liberation the modern Greek state included barely one-quarter of
all Greeks living in the Eastern Mediterranean. It launched an expansionist policy to
integrate Greeks from the rest of the Ottoman empire into the new state. Due to its
weaknesses and the incompatibility of its aims with those of the great power regarding
the Eastern question, Greece did not win any territorial gains until the Balkan wars of
1912-1913. Some of the Aegean islands were liberated from Ottoman rule, but they
remained a contentious issue both before and after the Balkan war settlements. Their
fate was finally decided with the Treaty ofLausanne in 1923 and reviewed in Montreux
in 1936. In 1915 Cyprus was offered by Britain to induce Greece into the World War but
Greece rejected the offer, only to enter the war later. The settlements of the Treaty of
Sevres of 1920 reflected the backing of the Entente powers to a loyal ally headed by a
resourceful politician, Venizelos. Greek control extended to Asia minor, where an
expeditionary force was sent. Political infighting in Greece, a tired population from
endless wars, the tilt in French, Italian and British policies towards Turkey and the
ascendancy of a nationalist Turk, Mustafa Kemal, to power brought about what Greeks
have named "the Minor Asia catastrophe." It is that very moment that Turks celebrate as
the creation of their modern state.
The Treaty of Lausanne —which along with the treaty of Paris, signed after the
end of the Second World War describe in effect the Greek-Turkish borders— marked the
beginning of a period of detente. It also marked the end of any further Greek aspirations
for "megali idea" It is interesting to explain why this detente occurred as it is also
interesting to note some of the revisionist ideas about its validity and significance that
tend to put the Greek-Turkish conciliation of the 1930 along a more realist perspective
(Hidiroglou, 1995). A need "for peace at home, peace abroad" was not dictated by
choice but by the necessity to consolidate the nascent Turkish republic. Some of
Ataturk's policies which allow for the revisionism in the examination of Greek-Turkish
detente are the promotion of culturally expansionist theories (Turkish national theory of
the sun), the existence of a coordinated effort to "rewrite" history by eliminating any
Greek tradition, dating back to Homer, and by some anti-Greek diatribes attributed to
him, or sponsored by him (Hidiroglou, 1995, pp.29-31).
During the Second World War and immediately after it at the Paris peace
conference, Turkey was pressing for a change in the status of the Aegean, albeit
unsuccessfully. After the end of the war the Dodecanese islands were transferred to
Greece from Italy, making the Aegean a Greek sea, politically and otherwise. The US
emerged as one of the superpowers in the region. The Soviet threat and the Truman
doctrine brought Greece and Turkey closer together. A second period of friendly and
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cooperative relations that followed the Second World War can be more easily explained
by the realist emphasis on the overwhelming Soviet threat and the relative weakness of
both states. In 1952 both countries joined NATO; in 1953 they signed a Treaty of
friendship and Cooperation, and in 1954 they signed a formal Treaty of Alliance. In
1955, there occurs a break to the concept of Greek-Turkish friendship. It remains to be
seen if it has been permanent.
C. METHODOLOGY
After a brief historical overview of Greek-Turkish relations and a review on the
bibliography on Greek-Turkish relations, the first part of the analysis is based on the case
studies of crises. The selection of crises as a subject of study is based on the assumption
that in crises one can observe policy choices which display the national interest,
constrained by the structure of the international system as well as by domestic factors.
The thesis also makes use of the concepts forwarded by George, Smoke, Lebow and Stein
for theory formulation in the field of crisis management and deterrence theory.4 A
description of theories of crisis management is found in Richardson3 (Richardson, 1994).
Briefly, in the Greek-Turkish conflict we are examining a sub-limited level of relations ~
compared to the superpower exchanges— therefore, we lack an extensive body of
4
For a discussion see World Politics Vol. XLI, January 1989. The Rational Deterrence Debate: A
Symposium
5
His taxonomy of theories on crises is: (1) rational choice theories (2) Psychological theories of decision
making (3) political theories, including bureaucratic politics, (4) theories of adversary interaction and (5)
systemic and deterministic theories
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theoretical knowledge to properly define theories and laws. Instead, we are comparing
generalizations found in relevant crisis management studies with the insight of historical
analysis to validate or reject them. Our approach follows the method of Alexander
George in Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management .
What is an international crisis? Available definitions seem complementary to one
another and one needs to integrate them in order to operationalize crisis characteristics
beyond the strictest of analytical examinations. Richardson defines crisis as an "acute
conflict between two or more states, associated with a specific issue and involving a
perception by decision makers of a serious risk of war." (Richardson, 1994) His
definition is an improvement on a Snyder-Diesing definition describing international
crisis as "a sequence of interactions between the governments oftwo or more sovereign
states in severe conflict, short of actual war but involving the perception of a dangerously
high probability of war." (Richardson, 1994) Richardson includes perceptions as an
element of crises at a more general level and escapes from the narrow, game theoretic
notion of sequential moves. Furthermore, he focuses on the "issue" which is the
perceived basis for the crisis.
Systems analysis has provided us with a different view of the international
system. Brecher defines international crisis as "...a situational change in an international
system characterized by two individually necessary and collectively sufficient conditions:
(1) distortion in the type and an increase in the intensity of disruptive interactions, with a
high probability of military hostilities; and (2) a challenge to the existing structure of the
system." (Brecher and James, 1986) Bell identifies crises as "...turning points in
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relations among states." (Richardson, 1994) Those definitions focus on the changes
induced by the crisis, however they miss the question of the origins of crises. To fill the
gap for our analysis we borrow from Lebow his "...three operational criteria: (1) Policy-
makers perceive that the action or threatened action of another international actor
seriously impairs concrete national interests, the country's bargaining reputation, or their
own ability to remain in power; (2) Policy-makers perceive that any actions on their part
designed to counter this threat (capitulation aside) will raise a significant prospect of
war; (3) Policy makers perceive themselves to be acting under time constraints."(Lebow,
1981, pp. 10-12) Implicitly he assigns as plausible causes the national interests,
reputation and domestic politics, without disregard for misperception. All of the above
definitions (with the possible exception of Bell's) point to the need for a three-phase
analysis of crises: Origins, characteristics or dynamics and outcomes or lessons. Thus,
our work will focus on those three aspects of the crises under examination.
The crises selected for analysis are; the 1955 crisis after the Istanbul pogrom
events, the 1963-64 crisis in Cyprus after the inter-communal strife, the 1967 crisis again
over Cyprus, the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus, the series of crises between 1976 and
1978 over the Aegean, and the 1987 crisis in the Aegean. Those were the more intense,
and as such on one hand posed the greatest threat to stability, and on the other have been
covered extensively in various analyses. They also signify either branching points of
historical development or have acquired high symbolic power in both countries, giving
material for analysis on the question of outcomes. The 1996 crisis, even though it is
important from both the theoretical as well as the policy making perspectives, could not
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be sufficiently documented and therefore was not included here. It is a major drawback
for the thesis since the 1996 crisis "exists" on a very different background than the rest of
the crises and offers good opportunities for comparative analysis. Nonetheless for each
of the other crises, we attempt to identify its origins and classify it after a typology by
Lebow6 . Characteristics for each crisis are evaluated with the help of three different
analyses made by Richardson, Lebow and George.
Richardson examines international crises under different levels of analysis using
what he calls "structuration theory. "(Richardson, 1994, p.350) For Richardson there is
no preferred priority among levels of analysis. "Social structures persist only insofar as
individual actors reproduce the multiplicity of practices which together constitute the
structures. They are not absolute constraints, and in modern societies practices undergo
constant modification as actors choose to vary them."(Richardson, 1994, p.350) By
placing the actor in the spotlight Richardson presents a scheme suitable for analyzing
crises, where the decision-makers choose among different alternatives, constrained by
situational or contextual factors. He provides us with a set of constraints and
prerequisites for ideal crisis management. His constraints include the international
system, the process in the choice of goals, perceptions, and crisis bargaining strategies.
We test each case under consideration for the presence of those constraints and
prerequisites. Their detailed list is shown in Appendix B, along with the findings from
the case studies.
According to Lebow crises are categorized as one of the following: accidental, brinkmanship, spinoff and
initiation of hostilities
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Lebow provides us with a similar set of characteristics for international crises. He
focuses on cognitive closure and crisis politics, misperception, and what he calls "the
context of crisis." George tests another set of hypotheses for effective crisis
management. Furthermore, he proposes a set of strategies for the originator and the
defender. For every case, based on analyses of the events, we identify the strategies used
and the abstracted "personality type" of the decision-makers. Mediation efforts are
another subject of our analysis. The "contingency" perspective on interventions by
Keashly and Fisher is used to categorize intervention types (conciliation, consultation,
pure mediation, power mediation, arbitration and peacekeeping) and their effectiveness.
In the second part of the study, a cross-crisis analysis is performed to identify
continuities and discontinuities among them. This will provide the basis for accepting or
rejecting the hypotheses stated in the introduction. On what factors can we attribute
different outcomes for similar crises? Do we observe any continuities in the way the two
countries react during crises? After the characteristics for every crisis and mediation
attempt are collected under each of the analyses above, we will have a comprehensive
view of different "pictures" of the Greek-Turkish crises and we might be able to answer
the following questions: (1) What causes crises? Should we follow Thucidides in his
view of the primacy of the underlying cause (interests) or revise him according to Lebow
who insists on the primacy of the immediate causes (perception) for the explanation of
the crisis origins? Do we observe any patterns in the underlying causes, which support
the argument that they reflect power relationships, or do they suggest culture as the
inhibiting factor for Greek-Turkish reconciliation? (2) Does there appear to be a more
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successful mediation pattern among the methods used? What is the relation of the
mediators' interest to that of the contending parties?
To make the logical process of generalization from case studies more apparent we
have added the following figure (Fig. 1 ). Here, one can see the interrelations among crisis
type, conflict structure, crisis management and stability. An aftermath of every crisis,
states usually re-examine their policies after a "learning process." Lebow, Brecher and
James, in their analyses of international crises, deal with the effects of crises on the
international system. Every crisis tests the hypothesis of system equilibrium. We
"measure" post-crisis changes by answering two "yes/no" questions. Has the crisis
affected stability? Has it affected the equilibrium? Stability is a measure of the quantity















Figure 1. Model of Greek-Turkish crisis analysis
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To answer the questions we consider Lebow: ". . . some crises have the effect of increasing
tensions and convincing policy-makers that war is more likely in the future."(Lebow,
1981, p.315) According to Lebow, six hypotheses are contributing to that effect; post-
crisis military preparations, the nature of coercive bargaining during the crisis and the
initiator's willingness to accept war as an outcome of the crisis. The other considerations
include the impact of the crisis upon domestic politics, the potential exacerbation of
cleavages within a society and the frequency of the crisis. We examine every case study
for the presence of those factors. Amelioration of hostilities is not impossible after an
international crisis and deserves more attention for its implications on conflict
management. Lebow suggests three major plausible explanations for post-crisis conflict
reduction; defeat in a crisis could force policy-makers to re-evaluate their foreign policy
assumptions, it could also diminish the impact on foreign policy making of hard-liners, or
it could facilitate the settlement of outstanding issues. Fear of war and a promotion of
empathy and trust among the parties could also achieve the same result. Figure 2 shows








1 1 1 1
Figure 2. Conflict process. From Lebow: Between Peace and War, 1981, p.337
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The third part will attempt to integrate the findings of the research made in the
first two parts, and provide us with some qualified insight into the nature (and the future)
of the Greek-Turkish conflict. The third question therefore becomes: What are the
dynamics of the conflict from a macro-view? That is the starting point for the final
chapter of our work focusing on implications of the (mis)management of the conflict.
D. UTILITY
The importance of successful conflict management in the volatile Balkan region
can not be overemphasized. It requires, however, a good understanding of the forces that
are active in the area and will shape its future. Historical analysis provides the necessary
depth and background for the policy maker. The Greek-Turkish conflict, even though it
is rooted in history, can be explained by an analysis of power distribution and great
power policies. Its management, however, is made possible only if one includes the
cultural and societal components in one's calculus. The scope of this thesis is not to
provide a historical test for the hypothesis that Greek-Turkish detente is possible; that
would be too optimistic and arrogant. It argues, though, that only through a mixed policy
of integration and boundary setting, and thus explicitly taking into consideration the
security needs of the countries involved, will the two countries feel free to pursue
friendly relations. If such a hypothesis is true, it might provide the decision makers with
some insight into further issues arising from the conflict.
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Success or failure in conflict management will have effects not only on Greece
and Turkey. European integration, NATO expansion and the success of Partnership for
Peace in the Balkan area are at stake. Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean would also
be more secure with a relaxation of Greek-Turkish tensions. Moreover, future Greek-
Turkish relations will have a marked effect on issues of international law and legality, on
UNCLOS implementation and on the CSFP of the EU. The history of attempts to
achieve peaceful settlements of disputes will almost certainly include the Greek-Turkish





After the end of the Second World War Greece and Turkey turned to the West,
and more specifically to the US, for support. Announcement of the Truman Doctrine and
substantial financial and military aid helped stabilize pro-Western governments in both
states and consolidate American influence. In February 1952 both countries joined
NATO after their initial request in 1950. Acceptance by the alliance was made easier
after the Korean war. The move on behalf of Greece and Turkey was dictated not only
by the Soviet threat, but by domestic factors as well7 . Greek-Turkish detente seemed to
be holding under the wider Western umbrella. Between April and June of 1952 the heads
of state in Greece and Turkey exchanged official visits to signal closer cooperation.
Following the Soviet-Tito rift in 1953 Greece and Turkey signed a Treaty of Friendship
and Assistance with Yugoslavia . During an official visit of the Greek Prime Minister to
Ankara he stated along with his counterpart that "... there is no issue between the two
countries that cannot be resolved in a friendly way." As late as 1954 the Greek Prime
Minister was declaring that "the Greek Turkish friendship cannot be threatened or
disturbed by the Cyprus question."(Alexandris, 1992, p.267) Both countries were seen as
".
. . Siamese twins guarding the vital gates of warm water entry and exit into the Black
7
Robert McDonald in Adelphi Papers 229, London:IISS, Spring 1988, p.72
8 The pact lost any significance after 1955
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Sea, and the soft underbelly of the Soviet Union"(Couloumbis, 1983, p.24) The
Republican administrations of President Eisenhower maintained excellent relations with
both Greek and Turkish conservative governments of the time .
Cyprus became the first issue to challenge alliance cohesion in the southeastern
flank after 1955. The two communities on the island had established under Ottoman and
British (after 1914) rule a relatively peaceful modus vivendi. The struggle of the Greek
Cypriot majority to connect itself with mainland Greeks (enosis) was given impetus by a
strong desire for self-determination earlier than other de-colonization trends which
followed in the 1960s, a fact which inhibited early attempts for internationalization
through the UN. Even though Great Britain had offered Cyprus as bait to a neutralist
Greek government in 1915 for it to enter the Entente ranks during the First World War,
after 1931 London had appeared determined to maintain control of the strategically
located island
10
. Cyprus had become a Crown colony in 1925. Yet there existed at the
same time a growing sentiment for Cypriot self-determination. In January 1 950
Archbishop Makarios had organized a plebiscite in Greek Cypriot churches for or against
union. 96% of eligible Greek Cypriot voted for enosis (Bahcheli, 1990, p.33). The
Greek government came under pressure from Makarios to clearly support the Cypriot
cause. However, it adopted a wait and see policy much influenced by British and US
reactions. Also, since it did not consider the Turkish side as having a legitimate right on
the future of the Cyprus question, it had stubbornly ignored planning for such an event.
9
Papagos (1952-1955) in Greece and Menderes in Turkey
1
In 1931 a Greek uprising was met with violence from the colonial forces. (Couloumbis, 1983, p.27)
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Greek assumptions in formulating a foreign policy were the given desire of the Cypriots
for union with Greece and the concept of the Cypriot case as a problem between Great
Britain and Greece. If the first assumption was valid the second ignored important
factors
11
. A former Greek Prime Minister has stated: "Up to the middle of 1955, the
Turkish factor was conspicuously absent from the planning of our Cyprus policy. Since
Turkey had, by the Treaty of Lausanne, relinquished her rights on the island, it was
considered in Athens that she had no role to play in our quarrel with Britain. The
argument was legally irreproachable, but politically questionable." (Theodoropoulos,
1988, p.35)
The British argued for a "domestic affair" and included the Turkish side in the
conflict as a measure against the Greeks. Strategic calculations made by the British
before the Suez crisis assigned an unacceptable cost to the loss of Cyprus, with important
implications on their position in the Middle East. The Turkish side felt that the prospect
of a Greek "annexation" of Cyprus would be against long-term Turkish security interests
in the area (Bahcheli, 1990, p.3 1). According to some authors it intensified the Cretan
1 9
complex in Turkish foreign policy . The transfer of sovereignty for the Dodecanese to
Greece after the Second World War stirred the same feelings but Turkey was unable at
the time to bargain (Bacheli, 1990, p.31). Illuminating for Turkish foreign policy
objectives of the period is a long declaration made by President Menderes on 24 August
11
Theodoropoulos, 1988, p.252. Those factors were; the prominent position given to the Turkish Cypriot
community by the British, a formal protest by Turkey dating to the second world war towards the British
and 1 949 towards the Americans, a strong public opinion against enosis and positions taken by all Turkish
parties on the matter
12
Michalopoulos, 1989, p.71, and Theodoropoulos, 1988. Loss of Crete at the turn of the century to
Greece has always been resented by Turkey
23
1955 (Michalopoulos, 1989). To avoid any misunderstanding Turkey sent a message to
Athens in February 1954 stating as unacceptable the option of enosis to Turkish strategic
interests (Theodoropoulos, 1988). Later, as a minimum, Turks advocated the status quo
and for the first time the word partition (in Turkish taksim) entered the Cyprus
argumentation. In a remarkably prophetic quote in 1951 the Turkish Foreign Minister
said "Should any changes in the existing arrangements be seriously considered, we shall
not permit such changes to take place without our participation and due regard for our
rights." (Theodoropoulos, 1988, p.36)
The US at the time viewed the Cypriot demand for independence and union with
Greece in terms of its relation with Great Britain, Greece and Turkey, more as a potential
problem than anything else (Stearns, 1992). The US position was viewed as more pro-
British, seeking to diffuse the coming crisis and pressing the Greek side for an
accommodation within the NATO family. "Cyprus was a distraction from the overriding
need to contain Soviet expansion. "(Stearns, 1992, p.26) Michalopoulos argues three
main points for US foreign policy at the time: Cyprus was considered a trilateral British-
Greek-Turkish problem; regional stability was more important than Greek national
considerations; and the British policy of denying independence fell within the UN
premises (Michalopoulos, 1989, p.68). In effect, the US was against any
internationalization of the Cypriot issue for the fear of including the Soviets in the matter
(Couloumbis and Iatrides, 1980). The Turkish side played on American worries about
the Soviets by stressing the "... seriousness of the threats to the very existence of the free
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world" and calling it ". . . imperative for all free and friendly nations to stand together
unreservedly"(Couloumbis and Iatrides, 1980, p.36).
Greek politicians in the early years after the war, feeling the weakness of the
country, tried to align their policies with Great Britain and the US. Domestic pressure,
the blunt rejection by Eden of any possibility of enosis to Papagos and the decline of
British influence in the area allowed Greece to bring international attention to the matter.
The Greeks, feeling outnumbered in the alliance, preferred the internationalization of the
problem through the UN. Greece opted for both political pressure (1954) in the UN to
support enosis and military struggle in Cyprus (April 1955) against the colonial rulers.
The British did organize in August 1955 a Tripartite Conference in London to
find common ground among the parties involved in Cyprus. Archbishop Makarios,
whom Turkish analysts portray as the key persona behind the union struggle(Bahcheli,
1990, p.34), was highly critical of the conference, stating that it was introducing Turkey
as party to the Cyprus dispute with a say on the island's future. Greeks attended the
conference reluctantly, for not to accept would support Turkish charges of intransigence
(Bahcheli, 1990, p.3 8). Issue linkage was evident in the talks of the conference as the
Turkish side used the Muslim minority in Western Thrace as a diplomatic asset
comparable to that of the Greek Cypriots. Requests for their right to self-determination
were made in support of arguments against the self-determination of Greek Cypriots.
The conference ended with no results as anti-Greek riots were taking place in Istanbul.
As news of the riots reached the conference the Greek delegation withdrew and a
complete breakdown occurred in Greek-Turkish relations.
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On 6 September 1955 Turkish citizen groups attacked and destroyed the property
of Greeks in Istanbul and Izmir. A group of extreme nationalists called "Cyprus in
Turkish" deliberately stimulated anti-Greek emotions (Alexandris, 1992, p.254). The
vandalism was not confined to property but involved loss of human life, desecration of
graves and destruction of 73 out of 80 Greek churches in the city. One fact with
important foreign policy implications in the Turkish approach against Greeks in
Constantinople and the Patriarchate was Stalin's death. Alexandris proposes the
diminished Turkish fears of a Russian attack as a catalyst for the events that followed.
Even though it might have been of secondary importance, one can not disqualify it
completely. Two main issues should be remembered about the riots. First, they were
sponsored or at least planned and supported by the government, and they signified the
1 a
status of the Greek minority as a hostage for subsequent crises . After 1955 the number
of Greeks in Turkey rapidly declined, and today for all practical purposes there is almost
no Greek minority left. Menderes is quoted as saying: "Zorlu's job at London is to push
the Turkish case and torpedo the conference. Zorlu wants us to be active in Turkey. 14" A
former member of the Turkish delegation to NATO told the court (against Menderes)
that Foreign Minister Zorlu sent a telegram from London to Ankara stating that "The
British seem to be inclining towards self-determination for Cyprus... It is necessary that
13 The Turkish junta of 1960 in the Yassiada trials implicated Menderes (Prime Minister during the riots)
and his Foreign Minister Zorlu, as responsible for the riots. The prosecution alleged that they were
responsible for staging a provocation in Thessaloniki against Ataturk's birthplace to ignite events in
Constantinople
14
Stated in evidence during the trials mentioned above. Alexandris, 1992, p.264
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the premier takes appropriate steps to support my position" 15 .
The Greek reaction to the events was a strong verbal protest, and a written protest
some days later. Papagos, the Greek Prime Minster was terminally ill 16 . The crisis and
its aftermath were still handled by him and the next Prime Minister Caramanlis. The
Greek officers serving in Izmir at the regional command center were ordered back to
Athens. Greek vessels withdrew from NATO maneuvers and the Prime Minister
(Karamanlis) ordered the return of the Greek detachment in Korea. He further requested
suspension of extraterritorial agreements for US personnel stationed in Greece and
rejected American humanitarian aid after some floods. He also requested moral and
material compensation after the events (Michalopoulos, 1989, p.9). It appears that the
Greek government was surprised by the strong Turkish reaction to the Greek struggle for
enosis. Under fire from an opposition calling for its resignation, the Greek government
declared its intention to reexamine the future of Greek-Turkish relations. NATO's
permanent secretaries met in a special session on 8 September 1955 to consider the
situation, but nothing substantial was produced.
The Eisenhower administration reacted to events with a balanced response
towards Greece and Turkey, which minimized the significance of the events themselves
and stressed the importance of alliance cohesion. The American Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles in identical notes urged both the Greek and Turkish premiers to refrain
from allowing those unhappy events destroy the partnership of the two nations
15
Ibid. Zorlu during the trial did not deny the telegram but has explained the appropriate steps as normal
diplomatic demarches
16 He died on 4 October 1955
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(Alexandris, 1992, p.267) and provided suggestions for the two nations to mend their
fences (Couloumbis, 1983, p.29). The letters were a result of bureaucratic infighting
within the State Department and not a product of a coherent foreign policy (Stearns,
1992, p.29). Such wording caused anti-American sentiments in Greece and some Greek
newspapers referred to the letter as blackmail, since in the letter there was a subtle
reference to US aid (Stearns, 1992, p.32). Official Greek and Turkish reactions to the
letters were diametrically opposed. Turkish Prime Minister Menderes found "great
satisfaction" where the Greek Prime Minister Papagos observed that "your message does
not correspond to the true development of events." American commentators were also
critical of the administration's position (Stearns, 1992). The only official voice from a
US perspective which came closer to the Greek positions was a comment by
CINCSOUTH, Admiral William M. Fechtler: "I thoroughly understand the Greek
viewpoint. We want to cure the situation." (Stearns, 1992, p.34)
The crisis did not end with the end of the riots. New items that surfaced as points
of friction between Greece and Turkey were the status of the Patriarchate and the
protection of the Greek minority in Turkey. Indicative of the mood in the security field
of the time is a pamphlet published after the Cyprus conflict of 1955 and attributed to
Greek Foreign Minister Averoff It included a perception of possible Turkish military
actions in the Aegean, with time constraints set for the Greek reaction and described
possible Greek reactions after a further Turkish provocation. It is important to note some
lines from the last paragraph of the pamphlet: "since Greece's honor would have been at
stake, and as the military undertaking against Constantinople would have been difficult,
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the Greek government would have sought assistance from any party that might be
interested to see Turkey removed from the Straits" (Alexandris, 1992, p.268). The same
Foreign Minister suggested that a possible way out of the conflict was an exchange of
population between Turkish Cypriots and Constantinopolitan Greeks 17 . Such a
proposition was not of interest to the Turks, however, since their interest in Cyprus was
and is strategic and not demographic. Furthermore the British administration in Cyprus
was making extensive use of Turkish Cypriots against EOKA (the nationalistic
organization for enosis). Inter-communal killings began in 1956 and the Turkish side
changed strategies from anti-union to pro-partition (Bahcheli, 1990, p.39). The British
side saw a turning point in its Cyprus policy after the Suez crisis. Cyprus, was important
but not sufficient for a successful Middle Eastern policy. Realization of that fact alone
allowed a British flexibility on the issue of Cypriot independence (Stearns, 1992, p.27).
B. 1963-1964
The 1963-1964 crisis can not be understood without recounting the events which
led to the signing of the London and Zurich agreements. It was the product of an
unworkable constitutional structure created by those agreements and by the real conflict
between Turkish security interests and an independent Cypriot state. After 1955 EOKA,
the Greek-Cypriot underground organization, intensified its struggle for independence.
At the same time British officials proposed a series of plans that were rejected by one or
17
Suggestion made to the American Ambassador in Greece George Allen. Alexandris, 1992, p.272
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more of the parties . In 1958 after intense intra-communal fighting and with the post-
Suez realization that British interests could be well served by having sovereign bases on
instead of sovereignty for Cyprus, there was pressure on Greece and Turkey to negotiate
a Cyprus solution (Bacheli, 1990, p.43). As Couloumbis writes, "...what began in 1954
as a British-Greek dispute over Cypriot self determination had been transformed by 1959
into a dangerous Greek Turkish bilateral dispute over the future of Cyprus." (Bacheli,
1990) Internationally there was increased tension in East-West relations after realization
of Russian ICBM capabilities (Sputnik), and the Berlin crisis. After the Cuban crisis of
1962 relations between the two superpowers became more stable as a consequence of
mutual assured destruction envisaged in the case of a nuclear war. Systemically this led
to friction within the blocks, as the French-US and the Soviet-Czechoslovakian cases
indicated
19
. Regional tensions resurfaced and the Greek-Turkish conflict entered a new
era since economic and political reconstruction in both countries was well under way
(Couloumbis, 1983, p.42).
The semantics of the agreement involved the forum where it was conducted
(NATO partners instead ofUN involvement in an international issue) and the balance of
powers reflected in the newly-formed state's constitution. Compromise produced an
ineffective constitution which provided for an independent Cyprus, even though
extensive intervention rights were granted to the three Guarantor powers, thus
18
Harting 1955, Radcliff 1956, McMillan 1958
19
France under De Gaulle loosened its NATO ties where the Soviet Union intervened militarily to check
the Dubceck regime
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formalizing Turkish stakes in the island well beyond the welfare of the Turkish-Cypriot
minority. The most contentious issues in the constitution were the percentage of Turkish
Cypriots accepted in public service, municipalities' organization, and the veto powers
granted to the Turkish community in the executive and legislative branches. Indeed, by
effectively using his veto powers, the Turkish Vice President did not allow for the
creation of a unified Army and obstructed some taxation measures. It became evident
that the constitution itself supported separatist and not integrationist ideals (Couloumbis,
1980).
After signing the agreements the Greek government was heavily criticized by the
opposition. Since Greece was democratic at the time, its leaders were pressured by
domestic unrest for a heated issue. Alliance commitments and pressures, on the other
hand, were arriving along with foreign aid, and acted as a force for compromise. The
treaties posed a challenge to the Greek side greater than to the Turkish (Bacheli, 1990,
p. 5 1). The primacy and bluntness of interventionism by Britain and to an extent by the
US marked the foreign policy decisions of both countries. Turkish governments were
more able to pursue their security agenda since their interests coincided with those of the
British and were against the Greek "revisionism." The Turkish military which had
intervened with a coup in 1960, shortly after the ratification of the London agreements,
pledged to respect them. It showed a remarkable and commendable continuity in foreign
policy. Public support for Turkish intervention in Cyprus was also strong (Ahmaz, 1993,
p. 140).
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Inter-communal violence in Cyprus in December 1963 reached a high point
following a proposal by the Cypriot President (Archbishop Makarios) to amend the
constitution . Makarios had since 1962 declared his intention to change the constitution,
as Turkish analysts point out (Bacheli, 1990, p.56). A series of representations was made
by the Turkish government to the Greek regarding Cyprus. At the same time Turkish
Cypriots prepared their own plans for reprisals in kind, thus effectively negating efforts
from the mainland governments to diffuse tensions (Bacheli, 1990). Nevertheless the
answer to the Cypriot President did not come from his own Turkish-Cypriot Vice
President but directly from Ankara. Turkish Air Force planes conducted overflights and
Greece opted for a non-NATO politically advantageous solution under the framework of
the UN (Bacheli, 1990). A British initiative had failed in February and the US was asked
to assist in conflict resolution. After a series of successful mediation efforts by US envoy
George Ball, the December crisis was diffused (Steams, 1992). The nature of "shuttle
diplomacy" and the lack of in-depth analysis of the regional factor doomed the US
intervention to a fire fighting, short-term role (Stearns, 1992). The first UNFICYP
(United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus) was established on the island in March
1964. In March 1964 the Turkish Foreign Ministry announced that Turkey was
abrogating a 1930 agreement with Greece concerning the status of ethnic Greeks in
? 1
Turkey. Expulsions were conducted, and they were directly related to the Cyprus crisis .
In April and May the Turkish Government introduced measures that resulted in the
20 The amendment became known as the thirteen point amendment
21
Statement by the Turkish government spokesman: "unless the Greek government changed its attitude in
regard to the question in Cyprus, all the Greek nationals in Istanbul might be expelled en masse" Alexandris,
p.282
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Turkification of the Aegean islands of Imvros and Tenedos, whose status was protected
under the Lausanne Treaty. Greece did not reciprocate with the Muslim minority in
Thrace, but to balance the situation, initiated in July an agreement with Bulgaria to settle
some of the outstanding differences between the two nations. Since the Balkan wars,
Greek, Bulgarian and Turkish efforts in diplomacy aimed in belonging in the group of
two against the one (Valinakis, 1989, p. 104).
Makarios in April denounced the Treaties of Guarantees, stressing the need for
Cypriot independence. Turkish reaction was prompt, threatening invasion even though
President Inonu felt it was unable to undertake such an operation. The crisis ended with
actual fighting between the two communities in August with civilian losses on both sides.
At the time Greece did send fighter jets to support Greek Cypriot positions when under
fire by Turkish planes, but they conducted only overflights to boost morale, without
engaging after strict orders from the Greek political leadership, since a UN resolution
calling for a cease fire was in effect (Garoufalias, 1982, p. 164). However, earlier
political changes in Athens (the coming to power of George Papandreou) led to some
important revisions in foreign policy. Most notably the Greek Government authorized
the stationing of an army regiment on the island to provide for a triggering mechanism
against further Turkish interventionism. The Greek deterrent policy is noteworthy in
view of current developments in Greek-Turkish relations. The Turkish press at the time
pictured the Greek decision as negating any Turkish interests in the island. Turkish and
NATO reaction was strongly against the deployment but the Greek Prime Minister
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insisted on the validity of his decision when confronted by President Johnson during their
meeting in summer 1964.
American intervention in this crisis alienated the Turkish side after the famous
Johnson letter (5 June 1964) to Inonu22 . His prompt response could be attributed to the
two-month-old and thereafter permanent presence of Soviet naval units in the
Mediterranean (Valinakis, 1989, p. 102). Nonetheless Moscow did not welcome Turkish
threats. Johnson wrote: " I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had
a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet
Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent
and understanding of its NATO allies." (Bacheli, 1990, p.63) Direct Turkish intervention
on the island through a possible invasion was avoided after that letter. Justification for
the harsh tone by Johnson only outraged the Greek side. "But surely you know that our
policy has caused the liveliest resentment in Athens and has led to a basic alienation
between the US and Archbishop Makarios." (Stearns, 1992, p.38) Most analysts posit
that Turkish-American relations were adversely affected by this incident. Another not so
well known intervention was undertaken by NATO and General Lemnitzer. He went to
Ankara during January 1964 and sent urgent messages to the Turkish General Staff after
he received information on a pending Turkish invasion of Cyprus. His efforts mark the
existence of parallel communication structures, which during crises need careful
coordination, a lesson revisited at the 1 974 crisis.
Similarity with the Dulles letters is remarkable in their reasoning and argumentation as well as to the
effects of alienation of allies
34
As a result of the Johnson letter and the Jupiter missiles removal from Turley
during the Cuban missile crisis, a more independent Turkish foreign policy was
undertaken. US reconnaissance flights from Turkish soil were suspended in 1965. The
Turkish government eventually denied use of Turkish bases to American ships and
aircraft for refueling or supply activities during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. The same
denial came in 1973 (Kuniholm, 1985). Such denials were not effective during the 1958
Lebanon civil war. Turkey initiated a diplomatic and economic approach towards the
Soviet Union, with implications for the rearmament of Cyprus. In the 1970's Turkey was
one of the largest recipients of Soviet economic aid outside the Warsaw pact.
American support for a solution to the Cyprus problem came also from Dean
Acheson with the "Acheson Plan." The plan served primarily Western interests by
placing Cyprus outside the non-aligned sphere and into NATO, while neutralizing
Makarios. Prevention of the establishment of a Soviet satellite state in the Eastern
Mediterranean was an objective ofUS foreign policy (Stearns, 1992, p.36). It was
rejected by the Greek side, pressed by Makarios, even though at some point the mainland
Greek government considered it seriously and had been favorable to it. From the Greek
perspective, a struggle for primacy in decision making existed between Nicosia and
Athens, evident from the first days of the enosis struggle. Lack of coordination and
sometimes (after 1967) competition in the diplomatic and military fronts resulted in
disaster. Stearns points out that Makarios appeared "non-aligned" with Greece as well as
23
It included provisions for the dissolution of the state of Cyprus and the effective partitioning of the island
under the concept of double enosis. What is surprising is the relation it has with current political realities on
the subject. Couloumbis, 1983, p.46
35
with the superpowers. In a little-known historical episode, the Greek government went
at pains to prevent Cypriots from acquiring Russian SAM missiles (Eleftherotvpia , 10
January, 1997). The Greek government rejected the plan during Papandreou's visit to
Washington in the summer of 1964. Some analysts connect his downfall with American
resentment for his arrogant stance against Johnson and his rejection of the Acheson plan
for Cyprus (Couloumbis, 1983). The foreign policy record of the Greek junta supports
those claims. After some concessions made by the colonels to Turkey24
,
the Turkish side
recognized the Greek regime in 1968, the only country to do so besides Congo-Kinshasa
(Alexandris, 1992).
C. 1967
After the 1964 crisis two independent diplomatic initiatives for resolving the
Cyprus situation were active. Under UN auspices mediator Gallo Plaza in 1965
published his report, which was rejected by all parties. The same year the UN General
Assembly called for respect of the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial
integrity of the Cypriot Republic. The second diplomatic initiative involved triangular
contacts between Washington, Athens and Turkey on plans drafted with British
assistance (Valinakis, 1989, p. 108). In December 1966 a Protocol was signed in Paris
between Greece and Turkey. Turkey consented to a form of enosis in exchange for
acquiring sovereign rights at a military base in Cyprus, while the rest of the island had to
24 The most important one was the withdrawal of Greek troops from Cyprus
be demilitarized. The Greek coup of 1967 brought a group of colonels to power in
Athens and caused in Ankara a re-evaluation of foreign policy. Even as the colonels
submitted a proposal in September 1967 along the lines of the 1966 Protocol, a proposal
similar to the Acheson plan, the Turkish side requested full partition or return to the
status described by the London and Zurich Agreements. Any understanding achieved up
to that time failed.
Lack of compromise should have been expected as the Greek side after the coup
was weak both internally and internationally, and the Turkish side was keen on raising its
bid. The Greek government was facing European reaction to the coup and a US embargo
of weapons23 . European reaction came through pressure for a return to parliamentary
democracy, human rights and economic measures imposed by the European Community
but not followed by national governments (Valinakis, 1989). American reaction to the
coup was influenced by American security needs. Richard Nixon is quoted in the New
York Times of 28 July 1967 as defending the viability of a policy safeguarding Israel's
security with assistance to Greece and Turkey. Lack of substantial preparation by Greece
and Turkey as well as absence of clear American support for the plan further undermined
the September initiative.
It is interesting to note that consultations between the Greek and Turkish
governments were not conducted with the participation of Archbishop Makarios.
Relations between Athens and Nicosia had not been without troubles during the
Papandreou premiership, but the military junta supported a nationalistic strategy of
The embargo was lifted silently after the May 1967 six day Arab-Israeli war
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Athens dictating the future of "Hellenes." Thus, the colonels attempted to monopolize
responsibility for any developments in the Cypriot case and undermined Makarios by
using the National Guard and the Greek forces stationed on the island. On the public
record nonetheless, they appeared cooperative with Makarios (Valinakis, 1989). The
military leader of Greek forces in Cyprus, Grivas, was in continuous disagreement with
Makarios, with grave implications for the Greek-Cypriot community .
In November 1967, after the failed September talks, Colonel Grivas with the
consent of the colonels launched an attack on two Turkish Cypriot villages, following a
minor incident. Turkish reaction was immediate and included the threat of an invasion,
conduct of overflights by the Turkish Air Force and authorization by the Turkish National
Assembly for the conduct of military operations outside Turkey. The New York Times
reported on 29 November 1967: (Bacheli, 1990, p. 73)
The Turks see the moment ripe to get back at the Greeks for all the injury
and insult they feel they have suffered in Cyprus since the US in effect
prevented them for invading after communal fighting in December, 1963.
Now is the time, the Turks say, for the security of their minority on the
island to be assured for once and all, by agreement if possible, by war if
necessary.
The sequence of Turkish reactions confirmed a pattern of characteristics in the
Cyprus situation which remained constant until 1974 (Theodoropoulos, 1988). Cyprus
did not have complete sovereignty of the island, and the question ofhow much territory
was beyond its control was a question of quantitative and not qualitative difference.
Along with the weakening in the position of the Turkish Cypriot minority there was a
counterbalancing strengthening of the Turkish position and ultimata through the threat or
26
Makarios in 1966 has asked for a limitation of responsibilities assigned to Grivas
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use of force. Also, the Greek positions on the matter fluctuated and there was not one
consistent strategy followed.
Intense diplomatic activity followed the Turkish threat . At three different levels
the international community reacted, mostly after US initiatives. The UN with special
envoy Rolz-Bennet, NATO with Secretary General Brosio and the US with Cyrus Vance
tried to prevent general hostilities. Cyrus Vance was finally credited with the avoidance
of further engagements between Greek and Turkish forces. One more "fire-fighting
operation," it was designed more to defuse a crisis than to resolve basic differences
between the parties (Stearns, 1992, p. 1 1 ). Agreement was reached on November 30,
after what was to a large extent Greek compliance with Turkish demands. The Greek
contingent of 10,000 men stationed in Cyprus had to be withdrawn, and Grivas had to
return to mainland Greece. Reparations were to be given to the victim families, and
more responsibilities were to be given to the UNFICYP (Sazanides, 1979). Turkey had
to dissolve military formations opposite the Cypriot coast. It is interesting to consider
why the Greek government complied with the Turkish demands. Bacheli proposes the
view that even though Greece could not stand up to Turkey in an all out war it enjoyed
local superiority and he searches for reasons beyond purely military considerations. He
suggests that the colonels' decision was based on a reluctance to engage Turkey after
their proposals for Greek-Turkish friendship, their internal and international weaknesses,
and their weak bargaining position due to an a priori orientation towards NATO and the
27 Steams reports the hastiness of Vance's dispatch. From his notification for the mission until his
departure from Washington passed no more than three hours and twenty minutes. (Stearns, 1992, p. 12)
US, which many felt backing the regime. On the Turkish side Demirel was criticized at
home for not carrying out the invasion, showing the difference in the strategic outlook of
the two countries.
The 1967 crisis according to some was a turning point in Cypriot history (See
n.91 in Bacheli, 1990). A period of disengagement from the affairs of the island by
Greece and Turkey had started. Others view it as a continuum (1963-1974) from which
we can draw similar lessons (Theodoropoulos, 1988). Immediately after the crisis both
sides recognized the need for inter-communal talks. Greece was reluctant to continue in
its provocative policy in the face of political weakness at home and abroad. Turkey
gained strategic weight by eliminating the Greek deterrent from Cyprus, thus making
possible the later invasion of 1974. The realization of the Turkish ability to exact
concessions from Greece by establishing a credible threat was not lost by Ankara.
D. 1974
The setting for the 1974 crisis was completed after the 1967 crisis with the
removal of the Greek contingent from Cyprus and the changes in the regional and
international political realities of the early 1970s. In March 1971 the Turkish armed
forces intervened in Turkey after a period of political unrest. The Athens junta attempted
to approach the new Turkish government in an effort to resolve the Cyprus problem
between the two military regimes. This approach was strongly criticized by Makarios
due to the "closed doors" diplomacy adopted by Athens. Griva's underground return to
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the island in 1971 created an acute crisis between Makarios and the colonels.
During 1973 the Turkish government issued oil exploration licenses for 27 areas
in the Aegean Sea, some reaching up to the six-mile limit of Greek territorial sea28 .
Greece itself had already issued such licenses for areas it considered were lying on its
continental shelf since 1961 (Valinkais, 1989, pi 21). In June 1974 for the first time the
Turkish side contended that an extension of the Greek territorial waters to 12 nautical
miles was a cause for war. The lack of preparedness by the Greek side to counter
Turkish initiatives was demonstrated in the agenda of the meeting between the Greek and
Turkish foreign ministers in December 1973. Continental shelf discussions were not
conducted. The matter of the licenses was withheld from the Greek press and public
until February 1974. Tensions were heightened with the dispatch of the Turkish vessel
Candarli to conduct oceanographic research in the above-mentioned areas during June
1974. An exchange of diplomatic notes between the two countries offers us a series of
political and legal argumentations, their changes in subsequent years reflecting changes
in foreign policies . A series of Greek airspace violations by Turkish planes and anti-
Greek demonstrations in Istanbul completed the setting for the upcoming crisis. There
are two explanations for the timing of Turkish provocation: one focuses on the
Realpolitik nature of Turkish foreign policy; the other argues that structural changes in
the legal framework surrounding the contentious issues, coupled with their technical and
Despite Greek verbal notes in June and July 1974 Turkey extended those areas
Changes were made in Greek positions in an effort to appease the Turkish side
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legal complexity and political tensions made the issues difficult to manage through
normal channels and resulted in crisis. Both views merit consideration.
In March 1974 inter-communal talks in Cyprus were discontinued. They were
undermined by their slow progress, the presence of extremist elements in Cyprus which
destabilized the Cypriot government, and the manifested willingness by Athens to
conduct direct talks with Ankara on a framework based on "double enosis" (Constas,
1989, p.75). It is ironic that talks between Turkish and Greek delegations on the
constitutional future of Cyprus reached agreement 36 hours before the Turkish invasion
(Constas, 1989, p.77). The beginning of the 1974 crisis is connected by many to the
Makarios letter of 2 July 1974 to the Chief ofArmed Forces, Gizikis. The Archbishop
requested the removal of all Greek officers serving in the National Guard and the
disbanding of the underground nationalistic organization supported by the regime in
Athens, after two attempts against his life and rumors of an upcoming coup. The reply
came in the 15 July coup against Makarios and the subsequent Turkish invasion (20 July)
in support of the Treaties of Guarantees (I960)30 . The Turkish side maintained that it
was conducting peace operations. Hostilities ended temporarily on the 22nd after an
alleged threat by the US to withdraw its nuclear weapons from Turkey (Constas, 1989,
p. 1 12). By that time the Turkish armed forces were in control of a small portion of the
island, which did not include all Turkish Cypriot communities. Important for the future
30
"In so far as common or concerted action may prove impossible, each of the guaranteeing Powers
reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs established by the
present Treaty"
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of Cyprus talks was the inclusion in the cease-fire declaration of federal clauses for two
autonomous administrations.
The US has been blamed for its failure to proactively constrain Ioannides, but any
consideration ofAmerican involvement in the coup against Makarios has not been
proven (Constas, 1989, p. 107). Suspicions against American complicity resulted from
the lack of support for Makarios, as the legitimate leader of the Cypriot state by the first
American statements after the coup. The coup was a "terrible miscalculation" on the part
of Ioannides, the junta's strongman (Bacheli, 1990, p.96). The status quo was altered
beyond repair for Greek interests. It signified the end of the dream for enosis. Yet it
signaled in many ways a new epoch for Greece, its democratic institutions and the
realization of foreign policy truths and orientations outside the context of neocolonial
relations. The pro-European choice was gaining ground against the pro-American
approach.
From the Turkish side the right-wing Islamic fundamentalist party restrained the
political space available for the social democrat Prime Minister Ecevit. It is not clear
whether Ecevit would have pursued a different option if he had not had to appease
Erbakan. Facing US Undersecretary of State J. Sisco who was trying to dissuade Ankara
from intervening, Ecevit is quoted as saying: (Bacheli, 1990, p.95)
Ten years ago... you committed an error and so did we. Your mistake was
to tie our hands and stop us. Our mistake was that we listened to you. We
will not commit the same error as ten years ago.
Some analysts have tried to analyze as irreconcilable the character of Ecevit and his
handling of the crisis. He was a holder of a BA in literature and he was a social
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democrat. He had translated works of T.S. Eliot and Ezra Pound into Turkish
(Couloumbis, 1983). What this argumentation is missing is the importance of the
security agenda in the Turkish foreign policy formulation and the overarching influence
of the armed forces in decision making. Not to be forgotten is also the fact that Ecevit
had been Kissinger's student (Ioannides, 1992, p.l 12). Ecevit resigned in September
1974 the same day that the US announced the arms embargo. However on the whole
Turkish leaders have emerged triumphant from this crisis.
The Greek side was completely unprepared to militarily confront the Turks and
Ioannides lost political control after the top ranking military officers rejected any notion
of going to war with Turkey. Turkish analysis has recognized Greek unwillingness to
commit itself to actual fighting during the 1964-1967 crises (Constas, 1989, p.78).
Undersecretary of State Sisco had a hard time finding responsible officials in Athens to
negotiate a settlement preceding the July 20 invasion (Couloumbis, 1983). Sisco had as
his mission objectives the termination of hostilities (Constas, 1989, p.78), the prevention
of conflict internationalization and the safeguarding of possibilities for constitutional
arrangements (Constas, 1989, p.l 12).
The realities behind Sisco's mediation were a change in the international setting
and the American political scene. Detente between the US and the USSR and the US and
China allowed the US to escape from a fear of Soviet involvement in the Cypriot crisis.
Stearns includes in his analysis of American indecisiveness during the crucial summer of
1974 the Watergate political crisis in Washington and the recent transfer of responsibility
for the Greek-Turkish-Cypriot offices to the European desk in the State department 20
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days before the invasion (Steams, 1992, p.9). However, after the events in August the
question for American policy was one of high policy choices and not one of bureaucratic
efficiency.
After the failed American mediation many questioned the US stance, not only
from a moral aspect, which could be irrelevant, but as a demonstration of America's
diminishing influence in the region compared with what it has been in the previous
decade31 . A breakdown in US intelligence gave conflicting reports during the last hours
before the coup (Ioannides, 1992). As a critic of Kissinger's foreign policy decisions
before and during the crisis, Laurence Stern, has written: "And so while Kissinger's
contribution was to purge American foreign policy of the Protestant missionary spirit
with which Dulles had imbued it, his failure was in not understanding the imperatives of
change among and within nations... .An American foreign policy that fails to comprehend
these forces may be doomed to sterility and failure." (Couloumbis, 1983). George Ball,
commenting on 1974 US diplomacy, said: "The moral is clear: effective diplomacy for a
great nation requires constant high-quality institutional vigilance. That is not possible
when all decisions are pre-empted by an individual virtuoso with a lust for travel."
(Stearns, 1992, p.36)
The post-invasion security environment reflected relative gains and losses for the
parties involved. Ankara immediately argued that the London and Zurich agreements did
not provide a margin of safety for the Turkish Cypriot community, and proposed either a
bi-zonal federation or a loose multi-cantonal federation. Before getting Athens' response
31
Statements made by Kissinger that the State Department was taken by surprise were not convincing
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to the above options, the last known as the Gures plan, Turkey in August completed the
invasion by extending its grip to roughly 37% of the island, justifying it by citing the
"security needs" for its forces. The second attack came after violation of the cease-fire
negotiated in Geneva, effective August 8. After the second phase of operations and while
Kissinger promised Turkish flexibility, Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit gave the real
dimensions of the situation: a Turkish presence in Cyprus had been irrevocably
established (Ioannides, 1992, p.l 15, and Bacheli, 1990, p. 100).
Athens was intimidated once more and, at a moment of political chaos, took the
drastic decision to withdraw from the military side of the Alliance. NATO on its part
through its Secretary General (Luns), failed to accede to demands by Athens for an
emergency meeting of the NAC . The Turkish side had to confront a delayed arms
embargo imposed by the US Congress in 1975 and opposed by all subsequent
administrations. Ironically, the most successful operation undertaken by the Turkish
military led to an international condemnation and political "defeat." Important strategic
gains were made however, both material and psychological. Following reports about the
conduct of troops during the invasion and other reports of human rights violations, the
European countries focused on human right conditions in Turkey and created an obstacle
for further Turkish integration into Europe.
Decisions made during the negotiations that followed the 1974 events included
the important step by Athens to internationalize the problem, to advocate a peaceful
solution and the abandonment of a Palestinian-like struggle. The choice was a forced
The Secretary General was vacationing in the Black Forrest. (Steams, 1992, p. 68)
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one in view of the stand taken by the international community, and it has led to an
operational policy of compromise. The resultant economic success of the Greek-Cypriot
approach has backfired in an interesting way. The US and other countries continue to
call on Cyprus to assume the economic burden of developing the occupied territories as a
peace investment and many both within and outside Cyprus appear unwilling to pursue a
long-term struggle for liberation out of a fear of losing established gains (Couloumbis,
1980).
1976
Following the 1974 crisis outstanding issues between Greece and Turkey were
expanded to areas beyond Cyprus. The main axis of confrontation now became the
Aegean, since Cyprus was developing independently of day to day policy decisions in
Athens and Ankara. The extent of the Greek territorial sea and airspace, the delimitation
of the continental shelf, the rearmament of the Greek islands, and NATO command and
control arrangements together constitute the Aegean dispute which still plagues relations
between the two countries. Issues become linked to one another, thereby allowing for
opportunities or posing constraints on compromise, depending on the assumptions made
of the nature of the conflict. East-West detente, reaching its apogee in the summer of
1975 with the Conference for Security and Cooperation for Europe (CSCE), resulted in
threat re-evaluations from the Greek side (Valinakis, 1989, p. 192).
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The Aegean dispute is a result of conflicting core interests, a zero-sum game
mentality and an analytical primacy of politico-military instead of politico-economic
strategic considerations (Stearns, 1992). Security issues become more and more
important as continual crises threaten peace. Mediation or compromise becomes
difficult because of two different approaches to the contending issues adopted by the two
countries. Greece insists on a legalistic analysis since international law is seen as
supportive of Greek positions. Turkey favors a political basis for compromise, the
concept of "equity," which best reflects power and status realities (Bacheli, 1990, p. 132).
Here, it is not intended to analyze the issues. We focus on events from three different
crises in the post- 1974 era which signify three different epochs. In 1976 a conservative
government in Greece and a weak government in Turkey face an Aegean crisis. In 1987
a socialist Greek cabinet faces an Aegean crisis against a Turkish President modernizing
his country. And in 1996 we observe the first serious Greek-Turkish crisis in the post-
Cold War environment. Theses in Greek-Turkish relations abound with arguments for
continuities and discontinuities. In this context, it is interesting to examine the outcomes
of those crises.
In 1975 Greece and Turkey failed to settle the continental shelf issue, which had
arisen in 1973, through the International Court of Justice. Turkey had not agreed to
submit its case, backing off from a previous position, under intense political pressure.
Turkish political leaders were keen to recognize that existing international law and legal
precedent favored Greece even if not all cases did so (Stearns, 1992, p. 136 and Bacheli,
1990). Responding to nationalistic pressures the Turkish government ".. . decided to re-
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assert Turkish claims in the Aegean" by conducting seismic research in "disputed"
waters (Bacheli, 1990, p. 134).
In February 1976 the Turkish side proposed a "package deal" for all outstanding
issues between Greece and Turkey. In parallel, naval exercises were conducted by
Turkish forces in the Aegean at the same time that the convention for the new law of the
seas was meeting in Geneva (Sazanides, 1979, pp. 80-82). Later, in April 1976, the Greek
Prime Minister proposed an accord for not resorting to violence and for exchanges in
armaments information, which was turned down on the grounds of already existing
commitments through the NATO alliance. Only the US could put some pressure
effectively on the Turkish side. After the embargo of weapons the Turks reciprocated
instead of yielding and denied use of American bases and facilities in Turkey
(Woodhouse, 1991, p.309). Even after a government change in Ankara Turkey's
consistent position was rewarded with a defense agreement. Greece manifested its
insecurity by requesting territorial guarantees through similar defense agreements with
the US33 . The Kissinger-Bitsios correspondence is one aspect of Greek efforts to
strengthen its security position by third-party commitments.
In early August 1976 Turkey initiated a series of explorations between the islands
of Lemnos and Mytilini. The research ship was escorted by a naval vessel and closely
followed by Greek warships. This effectively challenged sovereign Greek rights in the
Aegean Sea. Perceptions of an expansionist Turkish foreign policy were already
33 When Turkey signed a defense agreement with the US in March 1976, Athens reciprocated, thus
including in bilateral US-Greek relations the Turkish factor. The 7/10 ratio in aid emerged in those days.
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stimulated in Athens after 1975 with the founding of the Turkish Fourth Army, or as it is
called, the "Aegean Army"34 . Also in March 1976 the Turkish Deputy Prime Minister on
the record said: "...all the Aegean islands off the Turkish mainland, including the
Dodecanese islands must belong to Turkey." The Greek opposition in Parliament
requested the sinking of the ship conducting the oceanologic surveys
33
. Greece
requested a meeting of the UN Security Council and appealed to the International Court
of Justice for an interim judgment. Recommendations by the Security Council attempted
to satisfy both parties' concerns and was drafted by NATO allies (Stearns, 1992). The
International Court rejected Greece's request for interim measures; however it continued
to consider Greece's submission for the substance of the delimitation of the continental
shelf. Response from both international bodies was not considered satisfactory in Greece,
but it helped to diffuse the immediate crisis (Stearns, 1992).
After the crisis was passed and negotiations were conducted in Berne in
November 1976, both sides undertook to refrain from actions that might impede a
resolution of bilateral differences through peaceful means. Greek concessions were
deemed necessary as negotiations between Greece and the EEC could be jeopardized by
the protraction of a crisis in the Aegean (Woodhouse, 1991, p.3 10). The pattern of
continuous resort to non-conclusive negotiations after the escalation of tension over
diverse issues led many to view Greek-Turkish disputes as a parochial theme (Sazanides,
1979, p.84).
34 A force not assigned to NATO, and including Turkey's entire parachute force, all the Turkish marine
units, an airborne division with helicopters, other select units and a fleet of landing crafts. (Constas, 1991)
35 Governmental constraint to pursue military action was heavily criticized
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G. 1987
The 1987 Greek-Turkish crisis should be examined not only in its most acute
phase of imminent hostilities during the last days ofMarch 1987, but rather as a
comprehensive example of Greek-Turkish relations. Domestic realities in both countries
and international pressures at many levels contributed both to the expansion and to the
retraction of conflict. Within the context of diplomatic initiatives preceding the crisis
and the "Davos process" of non-war resulting from it, one identifies most of the recurrent
issues in our subject matter. Still, an important question has not been answered, even if
speculations abound. Why was Greece dragged to the negotiating table and produced a
"deplorable" paper, in the words of the person who signed it, despite the advantageous
diplomatic and military position it held at the height of the crisis36?
After coming to power in 1981, Papandreou pursued a pragmatic foreign policy
despite more inflexible ideological positions he had advised during his opposition
years
37
. Turkish writers view his foreign policy as a strong departure from earlier Greek
positions (Constas, 1991, p.29). He conducted a personalized foreign policy with the
bureaucratic establishment many times kept in the dark about the tactics of the moment.
The preparation of the Davos meeting after the 1987 crisis was a dark highlight of his
personal diplomacy. Regarding Greek-Turkish relations, Papandreou connected any
future Greek-Turkish dialogue with a prerequisite respect for Greek sovereign rights and
36
Kapsis, 1990, p. 137. The book by Kapsis on the 1987 crisis is a detailed account of the events as he
then Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs— experienced them. It remains uncontested in many of his
provocative statements
37
Constas, 1991, p.46. Also there, a summary of Greek foreign policy objectives during that period
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the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Northern Cyprus. Papandreou based his policies
on the underlying assumption of a Turkish threat to Hellenism and not just Greece
(Constas, 1991, p.46). His basic point was that "negotiations with Turkey were pointless
because there was nothing to negotiate." (Constas, 1991, p. 18) It is interesting to
contrast this statement he made in early March 1987 with his subsequent acquiescence to
a dialogue after the crisis .
Turkish Prime Minister Ozal, after his coming to power in 1983, considered
Greek-Turkish relations to hold top priority (Constas, 1991
,
p.29). He announced a token
withdrawal of Turkish troops from Northern Cyprus and lifted visa requirements for
Greek visitors (March 31, 1994), among other measures, in an effort to create an
atmosphere of trust (Constas, 1991, p.30). Greece objected to any commitment, judging
such proposals as opportunistic (due to concurrent talks for the release of the EC-Turkey
Association Agreement) and insincere, as they were in direct contrast to Turkish
diplomatic initiatives (Turkey recognized the Turkish Republic ofNorthern Cyprus on 15
November, 1983) and military activities (421 Turkish violations of Greek national
airspace during 1984.)
39
Attempts for reconciliation made earlier (the 1982 moratorium
and an attempt to arrange an unofficial meeting —ironically in Davos— in 1986) had
failed after a series of incidents, the most serious involving the death of three soldiers at
the Greek-Turkish border. Western reaction to an apparent Greek "intransigence"
became increasingly pronounced. As a Turkish analyst writes, "western reaction became
38 Cofoudakis in Constas, p.47, and f. 15, p. 55 "A dialogue meant give and take, and in our case is only to
give. We do not have any claims, and therefore there can be nothing positive for Greece from such a
dialogue."
39
Action was condemned by Resolutions 554 and 550 of the UNSC
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more and more partial towards Ozal. It seemed as if Greece was to pay the price iftwo
important members of the Western Alliance's south flank were not to talk." (Constas,
1991, p.31)
The continental shelfbecame the immediate cause of yet another crisis between
Greece and Turkey in late March 1987. Greece tabled a bill in March 6 to take control of
the Canadian owned North Aegean Petroleum Company. NAPC had made earlier plans
to conduct oil drillings in an area beyond Greek territorial waters and made a provocative
announcement on 24 February, 1987 about its intent to execute such drillings after March
28 (Kapsis, 1990, p.49). The Canadian company suspected that Greece wanted a better
share of the prospective oil deposits and clearly objected to the bill. Turkey concurred in
its estimation with the Canadian company. The Wall Street Journal of March 4
published an article on the possibility of a Greek-Turkish crisis. Turkey tried to get a
statement from the Greek government to the effect that Greece would refrain from
drilling outside its territorial sea.
The Greek government was in a dilemma because any such statement would
provide a renewed basis to the Berne Protocol of 1976, limiting what Greece views as
sovereign rights in the Aegean Sea. The Berne Protocol limited any provocative
unilateral actions in the Aegeanfor the duration ofa negotiation about the continental
shelf. An interesting point is that the license to the Canadian firm was due to expire on
April 1, 1987, and it led to speculation of the consortium's involvement in the making of
the crisis. It is revealing for the case to note that technically there was no possibility for
any oil exploration until six months after March due to equipment maintenance.
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The proposed bill was met with an announcement for a Turkish deployment of its
own research vessel under naval escort, after accusing Greece of breaching the Berne
protocol. As Birand notes, the Turkish military had to choose between an all-out war in
order to stop any Greek exploration or a similar undertaking. The announcement
followed a Turkish diplomatic note to the Secretary General of the UN on March 25.
Prime Minister Ozal was at the time in London, recuperating from heart surgery he had
had some days earlier in Houston, Texas. A series of announcements made by the
Turkish government detailed the projected vessel's course, drawing it within twelve
nautical miles from the Greek coast. The Greek government stated it would confront the
ship and put military units on alert status.
Papandreou held NATO and the US to be responsible for the crisis. Kapsis
decribes Papandreou telling the Ministerial Council ofMarch 27 that at the time before
the crisis US Undersecretary ofDefense Richard Pearl was still in Ankara (he left on
March 26 after a 6-day visit in the company of Secretary of Defense Kaspar Weinberger),
even though he had resigned on 25 March 40 . Papandreou subsequently ordered the
suspension of all communication activities at the US base in Nea Makri, and dispatched
his Foreign Minister to Sofia. In another carefully planned move, he briefed the Warsaw
Pact ambassadors prior to their NATO counterparts. European countries took a clear
stand in favor of Greek positions. The US stuck to its traditional policy of equal
distances. Lord Carrington, then NATO's Secretary General, assumed the role of
40
Kapsis states that there is no known connection between the Turkish planning and Pearl, however he
refers to a statement made by Pearl at the time of his departure; "I hope that Greece will not act foolishly. .
.
Ozal has good intentions but Papandreou adopts hard line positions." (translation from Greek text)
54
mediator —after being briefed on the situation by his government— and got a statement
from Ozal that "Turkey would not proceed with the exploration if Greece did not proceed
with its own.
41
" The crisis was over. It was the first crisis ended by NATO's
involvement, even if indirectly.
Also important in the 1987 crisis from our perspective are the post-crisis
agreements and the subsequent failure of the Davos process. Why did both countries
resort to negotiations? Pridham refers to a strong personal element present in the way
foreign policy was conducted by both Papandreou and Ozal (Constas, 1991, pp. 80-85).
Further motives could be found in the shock apparent in statements by both leaders after
the realization of the strong possibility for hostilities. The crisis had a sobering effect.
Both countries wanted to spare resources for the restructuring of their economies.
Greece in 1985 had commenced an austerity program and Turkey had in sight an
Association Agreement with the EC. The Turkish desire to conclude the Association
Agreement was made apparent by the April 14 application for membership. Plausible
reason for Ozal could have been the domestic process of democratic consolidation he
initiated against a dominant military bureaucracy (Constas, 1991, pp.48-54). From the
Turkish viewpoint the Davos process focused on a definition of Greek-Turkish
differences with the goal of concluding a bilateral comprehensive arrangement which
would as a minimum refer to Bern. It also meant that Cyprus would be set aside until
trust could be built in the Aegean. The vehicle for a deeper, social rapprochement was
perceived to be a growth in economic exchanges.
41
Later, Ozal in an interview confessed that he "wanted Carrington to keep his hands off the issue."
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In Greece, Papandreou was heavily criticized for the Davos process. It is still not
clear what "induced" or "pushed" him to the conduct of direct and unprepared talks.
Foreign Service officials resigned and the opposition took the offensive for what it
termed the abandonment of Cyprus. The Davos arrangements themselves included
intensification of political and economic contacts, a hot line between Athens and Ankara,
the promotion of a set ofCSBMs as common measures. Greece lifted its objection to the
1964 EU-Turkey Association Agreement and Turkey lifted visa requirements for Greek
nationals and rescinded a secret 1964 decree restricting the property rights of Greek
nationals in Turkey42 .
The Davos process failed to produce any lasting results. It lost momentum due to
shifts in the domestic priorities of both governments. A series of provocative
declarations and activities as well as the realization of the differences in positions during
the negotiations held by the various political committees established by the Davos
process further undermined that process. The bureaucracies representing the
accumulated knowledge in the long history of Greek-Turkish relations failed to follow
the "experiment" of the two premiers, an experiment they themselves soon came to reject
later.
42
Decree 3801/1964. However, a similar secret decree, 3706/1970 remained active and became one of the




Studies of Greek-Turkish relations by academics and practitioners have
proliferated since 1974after the invasion of Cyprus by Turkish forces in response to a
coup directed by the Greek military junta43 . Two broad areas of interest are relevant to
our analysis of Greek-Turkish crises. Why does the conflict arise and how is it managed?
Thefocus ofanalysis ofthe conflict 's causes seems to be divided among the domestic
perspective (political structures and decision making in each country, incompatible
national interests, different strategic cultures, instability due to a long and incomplete
process of democratic consolidation), the bilateral-regional perspective (role conflict,
Mediterranean security, asymmetry in power, cross-issue linkages, diverse cultures,
threat perceptions) and the international-mediation one (role of the US, NATO, and the
UN, politics among the ECU-EU and between both countries) 44 . The lines between
perspectives become blurred partly because of bi-directional linkage politics from the
domestic to the international realm (Constas, 1991, p.73).
43
For a review of recent and not so recent titles on Greek-Turkish relations see "Vasikh vivliografia gia ta
Ethnika themata," Athens 1996, Sideris Pub. A quantitative analysis linking works published, their focus
and the status of Greek-Turkish relations could provide insight on the variance of parameters such as
international interest, threat to regional peace and stability as well as a sign of geographical dispersion for
academic concern with the issue
44 The roles of Great Britain and Russia/Soviet Union have also been important, but are less relevant today
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What are the causes of the conflict should be an established hypothesis before
attempting to manage it, although misunderstanding the conflict's causes appears
common among mediators. For the US in particular, Stearns —a former Ambassador to
Greece- argues that misunderstanding
... is the result of the inclination of policymakers to treat Greece, Turkey,
and Cyprus as components of a strategic equation rather than as states
with long histories and military and diplomatic priorities based on
regional concerns that may or may not be compatible with the global
strategy of the United States. Approaching them in this way has induced a
kind of tone deafness in US policymaking and has led to serious
miscalculations at critical moments. (Stearns, 1992, p. 16)
The prescriptive part of the literature on Greek-Turkish conflict management
seems divided over which contentious issue should be tackled first (Aegean, Cyprus or
both), how issues should be treated (disjointed, package, framework) and over the
preferred method for conflict management (bilateral, mediation or arbitration). It is
interesting and worrying that optimism is absent for a near-term solution.
B. TURKISH DOMESTIC POLICIES
Veremis argues that Turkish domestic policies have historically been a synthesis
of three trends; nationalism, Islam and westernization. The difficulty in integrating those
trends is evident in Turkish society and creates contradictions that affect its foreign
policy choices. While secularism and westernization were closely interrelated in
Ataturk's vision, today westernization requires ideological pluralism and thus,
paradoxically, allows for the presence of more traditional Islamic elements, which were
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formerly outside the mainstream political process, in the political arena. Globalization of
economies and communication has also led to fragmentation and the emergence of
regional identities (Epetirida, 1996). If modernism was associated with the Turkish
military in 1930, today the economic-liberal part of Turkish society carries the burden of
progress, but finds itself excluded from the decision making process.
Overall, there is growing pressure from what was once the periphery of
Turkish society. Devout and suspicious of the old elite establishment,
which monopolized the center and tied the country to the west, these
recently urbanized nouveaux riches have been claiming their due at the
local, regional and national levels with increasing boldness. 43 (Kedourie,
1996, p. 177)
Economic liberalism should not be considered incompatible with Islamic resurgence.
Ozal's Turkey showed that the cohabitation of an ascending middle class with Islamic
elements is possible. During his presidency the number of religious schools has grown
immensely. Islamic resurgence in Turkey today acts as a catalyst for nationalism.
Moreover, the military has to resolve the contradiction in its roles of modernizing
and intervening in Turkish politics (Kedourie, 1996). Ahmad comments that the
possibility of another coup in Turkey is always present. His only qualification is that "it
needs to be welcome" (Ahmad, 1993). A news report in December (12/23/96 by Turkish
Daily News) quoted the leader of the Turkish Rebirth Party, Hasan Celan Guzel, saying,
"the army is making preparations for a coup. A 72 percent increase in military salaries
was approved out of fear of the coup." As a result of those intense socio-political
problems Turkey has also been characterized in a report as "a nation susceptible to
45
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imminent internal collapse."46 The western community is at pains to ensure this collapse
will not happen.
Turkey on its part has seen the West as a "goal" for its future. Approaching the
West though, comes with a perceived cost for Turkey. "Turkey's long standing military,
political, economic and ideological-identificational engagement in the west made the
military leaders vulnerable to western influence and enabled the west to adopt a policy of
pressure which was felt and responded to in the democratic transition of Turkey
following the last military intervention in 1980
47
." The statement's validity, if true in
1950 or even in the early 1980s, should be re-examined today in view of provocative
Turkish military proposals regarding "gray areas" in the Aegean, the conduct of
negotiations with the US for continuing operations in Northern Iraq, and the resentful
statements for a preemptive attack against Cyprus.
Greece has a particular interest in Turkish westernization and democratization.
Greek Foreign Minister Pangalos forwards two reasons (Epetirida, 1996). Turkey's elite
effectively transposes a domestic perception of law on the international behavior of the
country, exhibiting a revisionist character mediated only by power considerations. This
flexible interpretation of law —the concept being used is "legality"— becomes useful for
an authoritative elite in domestic as well as in foreign policies. Legality is less
deterministic than law and gains credibility from the relative power of the "advocate."
In the words of Turkish Foreign Minister Baykal: "The basic principle that guides
46 CSCE Digest April 1996 p. 8. Also see: Stavrou, 1996
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Turkish foreign policy is peace at home, peace in the world, however, peace should not
have priority over justice." The "rule of law" within Turkey receives regular
condemnation from groups such as the Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International
or bodies such as the European Parliament. Its international application has been the
concern of Greece as well as of other countries contiguous to Turkey.
The second reason -as stated by Pangalos— is the lack of transparent democratic
control within Turkey.
In the case of defense policy both Portugal and Turkey have
succeeded. . . in maintaining elite consensus and thus may reflect the still
important influence the military holds in the decision making process. In
Turkey it remains the case that the public is largely insulated from
whatever debate on security policy takes place. (Chipman, 1988, p.357)
Freedom in decision making could induce an opportunistic leadership to pursue
revisionist policies without serious concern for public discomfort. As an example,
Pangalos compares the varying degree of public debate for defense spending in the two
countries
48
. It is ironic, perhaps, that Pangalos himself has been an outright critic of
enormous defense spending. Compared with Turkey, Greece has to face a dilemma
common to democracies. Security comes at a cost which needs to be continuously
reviewed in an open society not conditioned a priori to accept the associated premium.
In the Greek-Turkish case a detente based on a reversal of perceptions (culture) without a
change in underlying realities (competition) is potentially dangerous for Greece since a
public opinion would be less and less inclined to accept security costs that are in fact
48
Greece in 1994 spend almost 4,000M$ (1990 dollars). Turkey had military expenditures of more than
6,100M$
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necessary yet are viewed as overstated. For recent defense expenditures see Table 1 . The
arms race between the countries is de-stabilizing for the region as a whole. Alliance
partners have facilitated this buildup since the end of the Cold War through cascading
conventional arms.
Defense as % ofGDP 1970-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1994
Greece 4.7 6.7 6.6 6.2 5.6
Turkey 3.4 4.4 4.0 3.3 4.1





Table 1. Defense expenditures of Greece, Turkey and NATO average as percentage of
GDP. From: NATO Handbook . Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1995
A European Turkey might ameliorate some of its mounting social and economic
problems49 A poor neighbor is a concern for "post-Cold War threats" and there are
indeed continuous incidents in the Aegean involving activities ranging from drug
trafficking to illegal immigration. "It is becoming apparent that only the resolution of
fundamental domestic problems, which are metaphysical in essence but real in terms of
the violence and social polarization they engender, can break down neighboring
countries' mistrust.
30
' The Economist in a survey of Turkey gives the following table
49
Social problems are resulting from a rapid urbanization, a young population, and an unstable economy
with large unemployment figures. One of the reasons for the ascendancy to power of the Refah Party
(Welfare Party) of Islamists is its promise of an alternative way The Economist, June 8 1996.
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(Table 2) as indicative of the standard of living of the two countries. To deflect attention
from economic burdens Turkey has pursued characteristically nationalistic policies "such
as promulgating bizarre territorial claims against Greece and reacting with callous




Cars per 1000 people Telephone lines per
1000 people




Greece 6,367 $ 188 478 212 8.5
Turkey 3,617$ 43 201 269 52.6
Table 2. Standard of living for Greece and Turkey. From The Economist , 8 June, 1996,
pl7
However, Greece's reluctance to allow the flow ofEuropean aid and funds towards
Turkey without any attached political guarantees and promises by Turkey serves well
Turkish preconceptions of a hostile Greek factor in Europe. Nonetheless in 1995 Greece
acquiesced in the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU. In the aftermath of that
development Greece experienced a qualitative upgrading in Turkish demands for a
revision of the Aegean status which culminated in the Imia crisis of early 1996. Eralp
stresses the preoccupation of the "governing elite of the Turkish republic" with the issues
of Westernization and the "Greek factor" in Turkish efforts to approach Europe.
The presence of a strong state tradition in Turkey has been the subject of a
creative exercise of Turkish art students in 1986. The students dressed in Second World
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War German SS uniforms and directed the public in half-German, half-Turkish "kimlik
bitte," "your papers please." People responded without questioning authority. The state-
centric tradition has flowed from what the Turkish intellectual Gokalp has described
between the wars as "in that state we need one nation." (Liakos, To Vima, 10 November,
1996,) Chidiroglou comments: "Where most states have instituted an army, in Turkey
the army created the state." (Hidiroglou, 1995) This tradition has led many analysts to
comment on the continuity of Turkish foreign policy, since the armed forces constitute
the power nexus of decision making. Others notice a continuum of repressive practices
against diverse elements within Turkish boundaries such as the Kurds or the Armenians
and the Greeks.
A review of the development of Turkish security policies since the creation of the
Turkish republic by Sezer reinforces one more theme. Turkish foreign policy has been
marked by a prominence of strategic utility rather than any ideological bias51 . The
Turkish ambassador to Iran in a recent interview is quoted as saying "Of course Turkey is
a US ally in NATO and a friend of the US. However, this friendship is no reason for
Ankara to be completely affiliated with Washington on all issues. "
Kramer suggests two explicit priorities for Turkish foreign policy. First, it should
not negatively interfere with economic and societal development but it should mainly
serve the preservation of national integrity, the legal basis of the Turkish environment,
and the Turkish people. The problem however lies not with the "definition" of the
51
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52 Ahmet Mithat Balkan, interview reported on 27 May 1995 in Turkish Daily News
64
foreign policy but with its application. A maximalist approach to territorial integrity, a
selective inclusion of treaties and obligations in the "legal basis," and the irredentism
inherent in the "protection of Turkish elements" present a completely different picture.
Poulton on Turkey's exploitation of its people for military purposes writes: "It is likely
that military circles in Turkey also viewed the Turkish minorities especially in Southern
Bulgaria and Western Greece as potential military buffers. 53" Stavrou writes on Turkish
objectives in the Balkans: "One can explain the infusion of Turkish troops into Bosnia as
a second step to undo the treaty of Berlin[l 881]. The first one was taken in Cyprus. M"
Perhaps one could not find more indicative maximalist statements worthy of an
imperial and missionary conscience than those made by President Demirel. On Bosnia:
"How can Turkey that also came out of the hide of the Ottoman empire remain
indifferent in the face of problems even if there is distance and no shared borders." On
the Middle East:
Turkey has governed the Middle East in peace from 1517 to 1917. It
cannot remain indifferent to what is happening in the region today.
Neither can it remain indifferent to what is happening in Iraq which it
administered for 500 years.
On the Aegean:
Take the matter of the Aegean islands. These islands were under the
Ottoman rule for centuries. . . . Turkey has to do everything through
dialogue, especially in today's environment. If the other side does not
want dialogue, it has to explain this to the world public opinion. What I
say should not be misunderstood. If Turkey has no option but to use force,
it will do so and it will not be blamed for it.
53
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On Cyprus: "Cyprus is a national issue for Turkey." On Turkey's role: "The country has
a globally important role to perform.
D:)"
A form of cultural and academic "imperial" revisionism has also appeared in Turkey in
the tradition of the Turkish theories of the sun. It is important in our a-historic




Fuller characterizes Turkish foreign policy as preserving Turkish territorial
integrity, establishing friendly relationships with the great powers and having a continuity
in prudence (with the exception of the Cyprus invasion). He suggests a new outlook on
Turkish foreign policy based on a glorious Ottoman past. "The re-examination and re-
evaluation of Ottoman history, suggests that the Turks may come to see themselves again
at the center of a world reemergmg around them on all sides rather than at the tail end of
a European world which is increasingly uncertain, whether or not it sees Turkey as a part
of itself. d7 ' Greek analysts seem to agree on the revisionist character of Turkish foreign
policy although they comment admiringly on its quality and continuity (Hidiroglou,
1995).
After the coming to power of the Islamic Welfare party many have observed a re-
nationalization of Turkish foreign policy. It is expressed by anti-American, anti-western
and anti-Israeli declarations. Examples are the official visits in 1996 to Libya and Iran
' 5 The above statements were all made during an interview to the Turkish Daily News in March 1996
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made by the Turkish Prime Minister Erbakan. Thomas Friedman in the New York Times
(July 17, 1996) explains Turkish re-nationalization in socio-cultural terms as a backlash
against globalization. Others see it as a direct product of stagnant Turkish-EU relations
and condemnations of Turkey's human rights violations, or a series of differences with
the US over operations in Iraq. Caspian oil and Turkish proposals for a revision of the
Montreux treaty (Straits status) have been contentious issues with Russia. Security
concerns dictate a continuous discussion between Turkey and the US. The remedy
proposed seems always to be a strong support for Turkey on all issues involving Turkey
and third parties out of concern for losing a strategically important ally.
C. GREEK DOMESTIC POLITICS
Analyses of the significance of Greek domestic policies on the Greek-Turkish
conflict focus on three issues: the strong perceptions shared across the political spectrum
against Turkey, the lack of coordination in Greek-Cypriot foreign policy objectives
mostly before 1974, and the post- 1974 disenchantment with NATO and the US. After
1989 there is a growth in published works on strategic studies and they have greatly
CO
influenced the course of subsequent policy formulation .
Disenchantment with the West becomes more salient if one takes under
consideration the security guarantees Greece has always attached to participation in
NATO, and the extraordinary degree of influence the US exercised on Greece at least
58
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until 1974. "The humiliation of the 1974 Cyprus crisis demonstrated to Greek-policy
makers that the defense posture designed by Greece's allies at best was not compatible
with and at worst was contrary to the national interest." (Constas, 1991, p.98)
Differences with the US become important after 1974, which marks a Europeanization of
Greek politics.
Greece had been associated with Europe since 1961 but the process of integration
froze due to the seven-year military junta in 1967. Political motives and the requirement
of a strategic advantage against Turkey drove Greece closer to the European Community
(Valinakis, 1989, p.242). At many times, especially in the period 1981-1989, diplomatic
and other resources had to be appropriated between Washington and Brussels. The
presence of charismatic even if contradictory figures such as Makarios, Karamanlis and
Papandreou on the domestic scene has also drawn some analysis on the linkage between
personality variables and foreign policy formulation. The Davos "non-war" initiative of
1987-1988 has been viewed as an exercise in foreign relations at the personal level
(Papandreou-Ozal) instead of a systematic effort to minimize differences (Constas, 1991,
p. 59). The Davos process culminated in intense domestic criticism of Papandreou'
s
decisions. The most articulate criticism came from resigned Foreign Ministry officials
and the opposition for the alleged abandonment of principles established in Greek foreign
policy and the potentially disastrous ramifications of such ill-prepared initiatives for the
future. De-linking progress in Cyprus with bilateral negotiations and a self-imposed
restraint by Greece on the continental shelf explorations were amongst the debated issues
(Constas, 1991, p. 52).
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Constas suggests that international constraints after 1974 more than anything else
formed "...a broad consensus on foreign policy transcending party lines and ideologies."
(Vryonis, 1991) Chipman finds this more pronounced on issues regarding Greek-Turkish
relations. The consensus was based on the principles of an independent and multi-
dimensional foreign policy, the recognition of an eastern threat vice a northern one, and
the recognition of a certain divergence in interests between western attitudes and Greece
regarding the Aegean and Cyprus. Before 1974, Couloumbis notes, Greece "was
confronted by a long chain of political, economic and social crises, and consensus in key
aspects of foreign and domestic policy has been the exception rather than the
rule."(Vryonis, 1991) Greek political infighting and a competition for primacy in
decision making between Athens and Nicosia resulted in the 1974 invasion of Cyprus by
Turkey, in what Turks called "peace operations" and Greeks called "Atilla."
A broad accord on foreign policy and domestic legitimacy allows post-1974
Greek governments to adopt intransigent positions or rhetoric on security issues, feeling
immune from external intervention in the sense of external manipulation of the domestic
political arena
59
. Loulis, however, observes two different elements during the same
period: a strong ideological bias on foreign policy and a personification of alternative
foreign policy positions, resulting in political polarization within Greece and
inflammatory rhetoric. He forwards the view that a "second level systemic change" is
necessary for the Greek political system to function effectively and that the only source
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Larrabee, 1996. External intervention is a major theme in Greek political thought. It is interesting to note
for the historical record that the first parties founded in Greece at the creation of the Modern Greek State
were named after the Guarantor Powers, Britain, France and Russia
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of such a change is external to the system. It is not immediately apparent from which
direction such a change should come. The effectiveness of Greek foreign policy has been
much debated in the aftermath of the Bosnia crisis and the failed symbolic FYROM
embargo. Larrabee describes Greek foreign policy as "Greece played a good hand
badly," and depicts both the situational advantages of Greece in the Balkan world as well
as its problematic foreign policy. Coufoudakis sees the Bosnia crisis as an opportunity
for a review of Greek foreign policy. "Even though Greece, her European allies, and the
United States shared the concern about the risks of regional instability, they disagreed on
how to address them, and how they affected Greek national interests.60" Criticizing
Greek planning he goes on: "With the end of the cold war Greece seemed unprepared for
the depth of change.61" Despite this criticism, today the Greek contribution is seen as a
stabilizing factor in the area . The major challenge is coordinating individual foreign
policies with the outcome of the still on-going processes of European integration and
institutional change.
A major current debate in Greek foreign policy revolves around the suitability or
even the viability for a Greek-Cypriot "unified defense doctrine." It divides the foreign
policy and defense establishments along the lines of "soft-liners" who would prefer a
more multilateral and negotiated approach to Greek-Turkish relations, mostly through the
European Union, and "hard liners" who see multilateralism as a futile exercise based on
past experience. Their hopes are a credible immediate as well as extended deterrent. It
Cofoudakis: Greek Foreign Policy in the Post Cold War Era. Issues and Challenges. Mediterranean
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is important here, to note the quality of their disagreement, which is one of means and
not of ends. The doctrine itself promotes the view of a functional unity in defense efforts
within areas of interest for both Greece and Cyprus. It focuses on the international status
of the Cypriot State, its ability to conduct an independent foreign policy and the existence
of a Turkish threat to both Greece and Cyprus. Platias identifies four areas of
relevance
63
. Politically, Greece stops ignoring 1/10 of the Greek population.
Strategically it minimizes the "window of vulnerability" by revoking the hostage status of
Cyprus to Turkish aggression. Militarily it increases costs associated with Turkish
options, and at the diplomatic level, it creates conditions for the withdrawal of Turkish
troops from Cyprus. It also enhances the Greek presence in the Eastern Mediterranean,
an important area for Greek strategic, political and business interests.
Critics examine the feasibility of implementing the doctrine. They state possible
Turkish reactions since the doctrine itself would be threatening to explicitly stated
Turkish vital interests.64 With the doctrine, they claim, the essence of Greek-Turkish
conflict is automatically transferred to the Green Line therefore, legalizing partition.
Here it must be noted that at least in declaratory terms the linkage between the Greek-
Turkish conflict and Cyprus has been done long before the "doctrine," at the latest since
1985. The doctrine is more of an expansion of that reality than its cause. Opponents to
the doctrine claim that it would become an obstacle in finding a solution for Cyprus




Zepos in Epetirida 1996
71
at least through statements made by the State Department's spokesman. The question
that arises has not only practical but also political and legal dimensions. The right of
self-defense against a country, unlawfully occupying roughly 40% of your territory is
compromised in the name of practicality and convenience.
D. BILATERAL CONTEXT
Many are attributing the essence of the Greek-Turkish conflict primarily to a
perception of animosity6^ and all include perceptions as causal factors. During a RAND
conference on Mediterranean security held in 1995, the Greek-Turkish dispute was one
of the four security challenges for the Mediterranean66 . Bacheli presents the French-
German example as a simile for Greek-Turkish relations. Stearns accepts the validity of
the simile, however, he rightly disqualifies its overgeneralization. France and Germany
have maintained cultural exchanges for the last 200 years, at least at the elite level.
Moreover, France has not been under German domination for 400 years. Liakos
comments on the different processes followed by the two nations for state making.
Turkey tried to homogenize and therefore became an introvert state, at least until the
1 950s. Greece, on the other hand, attempted to integrate Greeks from the outside world
and achieve stability through extensive diplomacy and alliances, thus gravitating to a
more cosmopolitan outlook. The eventual growth and maturity of Turkey compelled it to
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66 The others were: Maghreb, the Balkans and the Arab-Israeli conflict
72
seek a role for Turks beyond its borders, a thought that troubles Greek minds. Stearns, in
that tradition, views as the most salient characteristic of Greek-Turkish relations a
struggle over territory, although it has taken many forms over the years.
In the regional-bilateral context of Greek-Turkish relations, the Turkish
geopolitical prominence is of paramount importance. Misha Glenny talks about re-
emerging axes in the Balkans in the tradition of Huntington. Potential conflict spillover
threatens lines of trade and communication to the Middle East . The way one views the
Mediterranean pre-determines one's options for conflict management in the area. The
Mediterranean could be conceptualized as an integral part of Europe, "the place where
/TO
the Persian Gulf begins," or as a region in transition . Future European security
arrangements, their coordination with NATO, and socio-political changes in the
Mediterranean all will have an effect on Greek-Turkish relations. One can not deny the
impact of a Greek-Turkish conflict on the above issues as well.
Analysts view Turkey as a pivotal state. Characteristically, Bacheli, Lesser and
Fuller in separate analyses present Turkey as a regional power. Larrabee too, writes:
"Turkey has also emerged as a more important actor on the Balkan scene," while Kaplan
sees a broader Near East policy emerging (Stavrou, 1996). Recent Turkish-Israeli
military agreements have encouraged similar projections. Thomas Freedman has called
it "quite simply, a major strategic realignment in Middle East." (Stavrou, 1996) The
presented option remaining for Greece is whether "it will work with or against it."
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In Greece, such dilemmas are considered yet another indication of the revisionist
character of a neo-Ottoman State (Epetirida, 1996). Greek strategic doctrine, explicitly
since 1985 but in reality even before 1974, has focused on a threat from the East, which
Platias characterizes as extensive and intensive (Constas, 1991, p.92). In assessing the
Turkish threat, Greek writers focus on statements by leading Turkish politicians,
diplomatic initiatives, and military posture. Bacheli recognizes three valid concerns for
Greek policy makers: the presence of the Turkish Aegean Army in the Western Turkish
coast, signs of a Turkish expansionist policy and the lessons drawn from 1974. In
attempting to balance the threat, Greece has attempted to develop an autonomous
security policy and a deterrent force capability. In a letter addressed to his counterpart,
the Greek Foreign Minister outlined Greek positions on bilateral issues69 . Turkey, on the
other hand, posits as Greece-related security concerns the potential transformation of the
Aegean into a Greek lake, the Greek opposition to a European Turkey, the activity of the
Greek American lobby within the US and Greek support for terrorist activities by the
PKK70 . Threats are clearly not symmetrical for the two countries, Greece being the more
threatened state.
A continuity surfaces in Greek-Turkish relations from an apparent realization of
the high costs of open hostilities. Usually after crises we observe a period of withdrawal
69 To Vima, 8 December 1996. Among others, we find 1) Greece is for a European orientation of Turkey
and for its approach to European institutions. 2) Greece demands from Turkey to accept international law as
the basis of its relations with Europe in general and Greece in particular. 3) Human rights violations in
Turkey remain a concern
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as the realization of conflict cools tempers. Coufoudakis writes for continuous cycles of
confrontation-negotiation-confrontation. Rarely do crises lead to open confrontations
(the main exception being Cyprus). Kramer recognizes that reconciliation has more
advantages for both countries
71
. An interesting case is the observance by Greece of the
1976 Berne Protocol that defacto limits its activities in the "continental shelf," as the
1987 crisis has proved. Moreover, that comes despite the 1985 retraction of the Protocol
by the Greek government. Today however it is "doubtful whether the Greek-Turkish
conflict could be settled under crisis conditions." (Stearns, 1992, p. 12)
A second observed coherence in Greek-Turkish relations is the lack of a
continuous political commitment to resolve problems. Lack of political understanding
between the two countries is seen as a hindrance to the success of any technical
agreements such as confidence and security building measures. In fact, arms control
measures cannot be a substitute for political agreements, as Larrabee observes (Larrabee,
1996). Political agreements were easier when a common enemy was present for both
countries. The two most pronounced periods of Greek-Turkish detente were made
possible in the 1930 by the Italian specter and in the early 1950s by the Russian threat.
The Davos period has been also the result of external pressure. "And even then, the basic
policy held by the two countries remained stubbornly the same; the methods employed to
solve the crisis were usually palliative." (Constas, 1991) Gurel also suggests that
"Turkey and Greece could only develop their relations in harmony when and only when
71 A response to the question "How do you visualize Greek-Turkish friendship?" comes to mind, given by a
Greek sociologist at Panteion University in Athens: "It is like God. I believe in it, but I doubt if I will ever
see it."
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they mutually perceived a threat and were at the same time encouraged by an extra
regional power dominant in the region to cooperate against the threat." Stearns proposes
two other stimuli for re-drafting Turkish foreign policy towards Greece: the economic
burden to Turkey of continuing an anti-Greek campaign, as well as the "status" cost
relating to Turkey's defiance ofUN resolutions in Cyprus. Even if Turkey has showed a
remarkable inflexibility in adapting its foreign policy to such inputs as international law,
it is probable that the possibility of a European future could impose some constraints.
Cyprus has been since 1954 the crux of Greek-Turkish competition. As Sezer
observes "In fact the Cyprus conflict has never had an independent life of its own."
(Sezer, p. 54) In Cyprus, one can still view the only "wall" left standing after Berlin.
However, in Cyprus people on both sides do not consider the Green Line as arbitrary.
There does not exist a minimum of concurrence in interests. A large number of settlers
has entered the northern part, which has altered the population balances of the status quo
ante. Moreover, in a stark similarity with Bosnia rather than with Germany, there is no
unifying Cypriot nationalism. Greek and Turkish officials make strong efforts to
reiterate any operational issue linkages with official visits to the island and declarations
of support or intervention as deemed necessary.
In broad terms, Greek-Turkish relations are an example of the dilemmas present
in asymmetric relations between states as the prevalent international regime fluctuates.
Turkey, being the stronger state, desires a political solution as it reliably reflects power
realities. As Baykal (as foreign minister) has suggested: "We are of the opinion that the
problems between Turkey and Greece should be resolved through a meaningful,
76
comprehensive and result oriented dialogue." Greece in contrast insists on international
law to support its thesis. "By promoting negotiations over judicial solutions to issues
such as the continental shelf, Turkey gave preference to a political solution over which it
could utilize 'might is right tactics', rather than risk an unfavorable court decision due to
her weak legal position." In an address at Yale given during a 1996 official visit to the
US by the Greek Prime Minister, Simitis explained why Greece does not view bilateral
negotiations constructively. Negotiations are political, and Greece has negative
experiences from the 1970 negotiations which saw many Turkish reversals. Greek
governments also have the unwillingness and the constitutional inability to negotiate
matters of sovereignty. Simitis also noticed a qualitative change in Turkish demands
during 1996, as Turkey challenged the sovereignty of Greek islands for the first time.
E. US FOREIGN POLICY
The West has always been a reference point in Greek-Turkish relations. Both
countries after the Second World War tried to integrate with the rest of their allies. For
Greece, it was the only ideological choice after a destructive and unnecessary civil war.
To Turkey, it was an aspiration for the elite and a source of foreign capital much needed
for the modernization of the country. US policy became an important paragon to be
considered in bilateral relations72 .
72 One significant tool for American influence has been American foreign aid. For a brief history of its
development see Arvanitopoulos: The Politics of US Aid to Greece and Turkey. Mediterranean Quarterly
Vol.7, No. 2 Spring 1996
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Even in 1980 Ahmad suggests strong American influences on who is going to occupy the
highest military position in Turkey.
The US regarded Greece and Turkey as third-pillar countries. Furthermore, US
policy towards Greece and Turkey has not been regarded as the most successful. "US
policy toward Greece, Turkey and Cyprus has in the past been so exclusively devoted to
the containment of Soviet influence in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean that we
have learned little about the countries that did the containing and have generally
minimized or disregarded their own foreign policy concerns when they did not coincide
with ours. " It is hard to forget an opening phrase by an American official that is all too
common in bilateral exchanges with the US. "You have to understand US security
interests and priorities in the area... ." Subordination of political to military realities is a
common theme. In general, Greece has been conceived as the weaker party and therefore
a policy recommendation by Washington has always been for Athens to refrain from
igniting conflict, especially when Turkey is a state with political instability. For the US
the potential cost of Turkey's oriental drift is greater than Greek sensitivities. When
internationalization of disputes between Greece and Turkey was perceived as inimical to
NATO or the western community, bilateral negotiations were proposed.
The US foreign policy towards Greece and Turkey has been characterized by
Stearns, a former Ambassador to the area, as monolithic and he suggests some reasons






states is, according to Stearns, any more insignificant due to the inherent instability of the
uni-polar or multi-polar system. The US has to resolve, in their addressing of Greek-
Turkish relations, the competing demands of morality and practicality. IfUS policy was
accepted for what it is, "that would not be a problem, however there is a confusion when
there is an attempt to conceal this reality by Washington75 ." Development of a long-term
policy is difficult in Washington since, as Stearns writes, "bureaucratic and political
priorities conspire to discourage the development of a long term policy." Stavrou
considers American policy calculations in the Balkans as ahistorical.
The American dilemma has been, in the words of one official, "in order to keep
Turkey happy we have become involved in a delicate balancing act in the Southern
Balkans. If you appear to favor Turkey too much Greece becomes nervous, and so you
have to find ways to calm Athens. 76 ' US have always been concerned with domestic
political developments in both countries since the end of the Second World War. Anti-
American rhetoric drew negative attention to Greek foreign policy from the US during
the Papandreou years in power. Now, the Welfare Party of Erbakan in Turkey has
become the source of such criticism. More specifically, American officials are reported
to refer to the "problem Turkey." Their concern stems from a "domestic political
instability in Turkey, its isolationism and a lack of credibility." (Elefterotypia , 7 January
1997) Political attitudes in Washington were not the same, though, towards Greece and
Turkey. Turkey has been recognized as a proud country whereas Greece has been viewed
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as a praetorian state (Couloumbis). Greece was not an integral part of Europe but a
peripheral country. After 1989, Stavrou notes Greece's vital interests and position vis-a-
vis the Balkans have not been taken seriously in the alliance or in Washington. Even if
the Turkish Islamic government has strained relations with Washington, "the rationale is
that Turkey is simply too valuable an ally to allow a matter like the sanctions law to get
in the way." (Los Angeles Times. 1 1 September, 1996) Rouleau goes even further,
suggesting that "[some European analysts predict] that Turkey will be one of the pillars
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of the Muslim empire of the United States. "
One of the consequences of the Gulf war was the tilt of Turkish security policies
towards the US instead of Europe. This became more important after the demise of the
Soviet Union, which inspired a premature revisionism for Turkey's role in the area. It
also coincided with an American desire to "minimize commitments to transatlantic
partners." (Kuniholm, 1985, p.36) Despite its role in the Gulf crisis, Ankara did not gain
a position in the expanding European Union. Some of the disillusionment with Europe
resulted from the actions of a traditional ally, Germany, when the latter questioned the
applicability of NATO operations in response to an Iraqi attack on Turkish soil.
F. ROLE OF NATO
Chipman in 1988 characterized relations among NATO and the countries in the
Southern region as "politics of emancipation," after focusing on the nationalization of
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policies, the different substance of Mediterranean strategic dilemmas and on a quid pro
quo nature of settling affairs. He claims that it is easy to observe
. . . the mental tradeoffs that can be made between the fact ofNATO
membership and the strength of relations with each other of the NATO
allies. When they [relations] are bad, much of the raison d'etre ofNATO
membership —closer affiliation to the west— seems to be less relevant.
The rationale for drafting security policies in the Southern region "... is not exclusively
focused on NATO requirements or on NATO threat perceptions." (Chipman, 1988,
p.336)
In Greek-Turkish relations too, one observes the political character of the
Alliance. Each of the two countries "... tries to use the organization to its advantage in its
disputes with the other; each weakens NATO in the process." (Haass, 1988, p.61) As
Meinardus writes. "It is interesting that the Turkish policy of vetoing Greece's re-entry to
NATO in the 1970s and making it dependent on concessions in bilateral issues is
reminiscent of Greece's present policy of vetoing Turkey's entry into the European
Community, at least as long as Ankara fails to call back its soldiers from
Cyprus."(Constas, 1991, p. 159) The alliance, too, avoids anything but political
statements in commenting the Greek-Turkish situation. For example, the island of
Lemnos in Northern Aegean continues to be excluded from NATO funding and planning
due to its contested status as a demilitarized island by Turkey, but is sufficiently armed
nationally by Greece. Generally in the Southern region, a region that has not received the
security prominence of the central front for a number of years, if ever, "...political
concerns have taken precedence over military factors." (Pedlow, 1992) The "Rogers
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agreement" for Greece's return to the military structure was the high point of such
politicking. A corollary of the Rogers agreement politics was the (perhaps necessary)
vagueness in command arrangements in the Aegean. Delays in implementing the
command structure after 1992 have nowhere been more notable than in the southeastern
region. The moral is that the cost will be paid eventually in some form or another.
The political realities observed by the alliance have exasperated the Greek side in
what it perceives as a clear tilt towards Turkey. As Prime Minister Karamanlis said in
the Greek Parliament after 1974,
Greece did not depart from the military command ofNATO because it is
against the alliance. To the contrary. Under certain conditions we are for
the alliance. . . . Greece left in order to protest against the Turkish invasion
in Cyprus. (Constas, 1991, p. 158)
Later, Greek demands for border security guarantees early in the 1980s were shelved by
the Alliance as no one was prepared to grant them. Such guarantees look today more and
more relevant on the eve of expansion. As Papacosma observes, "When NATO allies
initially called for the two disputants to negotiate their bilateral problems they
unwittingly (in most cases) supported Ankara's tactic of more than two decades that
seeks a political rather than legal solution for Greek-Turkish differences."(
Mediterranean Quarterly , Vol.7 No.4, Fall 1996)
Many in NATO view the Greek-Turkish conflict and its inability to manage it as
models of similar potential situations after the Eastern expansion. "It is important to get
both the East and the South right." (Larrabee, 1996) "If differences between Paris and
Washington and between Greece and Turkey are not constrained they could threaten
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NATO's structural reforms, its plans for a European defense identity and enlargement."
(Reuters , 20 November 1996) The US supports its role in the Mediterranean by
suggesting its unique ability to contain Greek-Turkish conflict. The question of
containment has been answered effectively so far. What remains is the realization that it
needs to be managed.
G. EU
Greek accession to the European community has altered fundamentally the
Greek-Turkish balance achieved under the association relationship in the 1960s. Prime
Minister Simitis, a Europeanist has explicitly stated in 1996 that Europe is a cornerstone
of Greek national strategy. European links have served two purposes for Greece: realistic
as well as psychological. The European Community was the only acceptable political
hope for stability in the immediate post- 1974 era. Disenchanted with NATO and the US,
Greece had to meet its security guarantees by upgrading its economic and political
capital. By investing in the creation of a dynamic and adaptable society Greece
attempted to overcome years of stagnation and political turmoil with a challenge. The
degree of success has yet to be proven as Europe itself is changing. That is not to say that
Greek-European relations are without problems however. Europe for a number of years
viewed Greece as an economic burden and a source of problems. The recent row over
the name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) exasperated many
Europeans. From their side the Greeks felt unsupported from their allies. Economic
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adjustments have also to be made by Greece if it is to be included in the second tier
countries of monetary integration. If relations with Turkey develop for the worst, that
would make this objective unrealistic, with serious economic and political/strategic
consequences for Greece.
Muslim Turkey feels alienated from a Christian Europe. Ozal was known to
comment bitterly on that. "[Turkey] has been excluded from the process of future
planning (European IGC) while others, which had until recently been considered
adversaries in the context ofEuropean security considerations, have been included."
(Kedourie, 1996) In a 1995 RAND conference several participants
. . . questioned whether it was prudent to keep Turkey out of EU. However
few countries in Europe support Turkey's entry into the EU. The official
explanation is economic. But. . . cultural and religious factors also play a
role.
After the Gulf war the US rather than Europe was Turkey's priority. Former Prime
Minister and current Foreign Minister Ciller is quoted as saying: "Europe needs Turkey
more than Turkey needs Europe." (Reuters , 20 November 1996) Economics and
domestic policies more than strategic concerns have influenced EU-Turkish relations. As
transatlantic relations develop one should expect direct repercussions to EU-Turkish
relations after American pressures to integrate the strategic component. Adjustments
Turkey has to make for a viable EU future include human rights, economic restructuring
and foreign policy areas. Important moral victories for human rights advocates have
been the judgement of the European Court in the case of Loizidou vs. Turkey and the
European Parliament resolution of September 1996 regarding the future of EU-Turkish
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relations. As the New York Times wrote on 25 September 1996: "The European
Parliament, which has little power but is considered a barometer of political opinion in
Western Europe, overwhelmingly passed a resolution. . . .asserting that the human rights
had clearly deteriorated since the beginning of 1996. Supporters of the resolution said
Turkey was repressing dissent and mistreating political prisoners." The EU is in a unique
position to exercise political pressure on Turkey with the coming talks about Cypriot
accession to the EU.
H. CONFLICT RESOLUTION
The issues dividing Greeks and Turks seem interrelated and there is a strong
potential for issue linkages during crises. However, each has developed over time its
own dynamic and history. The "Aegean dispute" has matured into a complex set of
problems, articulated by strong political and legal arguments from both sides . In its
course since 1973, it has developed a rich diplomatic history, involving bilateral
Protocols and Memoranda, decisions by the International Court, and the UN through the
Security Council. Cyprus since 1955 has provided the most violent exchanges. A
constitutional structure that provides guarantees for the Turkish minority, yet which is
practical enough has been the focus of mediation efforts. Turkish occupation of almost
half of the island in direct defiance of continuous UN Resolutions has defacto
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partitioned the island and created different political realities which are difficult to ignore
during the exercise of pragmatic foreign policy, especially when the will to confront
Turkey is lacking. NATO has been the arena of Greek-Turkish infighting for the shape
of command structures and budgetary arrangements. The Southern region command
structure has been linked in Greece to issues of national sovereignty, therefore making
adjustments difficult and politically costly. Turkey has used it for either denying Greece
a form of control over the Aegean or for promoting its own position within the Alliance.
The changes in Southern command structure after France's reintegration in the military
structure could prove such disputes obsolete. The last issue in the Greek-Turkish agenda
has been minority rights for the populations exempted from the exchange conducted after
Laussane. Theodoropoulos, himself a participant in Greek-Turkish talks, recounts a
history of conflict resolution methods applied to the Greek-Turkish conflict. Despite the
seemingly futile attempts at dialogue, which he calls "the dialogue of the deaf," he
supports the continuation of the dialogue, with some caution (Theodoropoulos, 1988).
Conflict resolution strategies for Greek-Turkish antagonism build on an ideal end-
state regarding the aforementioned issues. Part of the problem in drafting,
communicating promoting, and finally implementing resolution strategies, has been the
fact that different participants envision different end-states. Greece is considering an
Aegean of 12 nautical miles territorial waters its sovereign right. A clearly defined
continental shelf using the principles of equidistant lines from islands as well as the
mainland is the Greek position in what it presents as a "legal" difference with Turkey.
Furthermore, Greece supports the independence of the Cypriot State, with one
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government and withdrawal of any foreign troops present on the island79 . Turkey
considers anything more than 6 nautical miles a causus belli, would like to divide the
Aegean under the principle of equity, and does not accept a change in Cyprus contrary to
its security interests (that is almost any change at all.)
The US does not really insist on any unique solution (at least publicly) and is
satisfied if the process of reaching an agreement and/or the agreement itself do not
disturb American strategic priorities in the area. "It is inescapable that the successful
unraveling of the Aegean enigma will prove less dependent on the forum chosen for
resolution or the negotiating tactics of the respective sides than on the willingness of the
parties to work in good faith." (Schmitt, 1996) However, successful American
involvement in the process of conflict resolution would mark a maturity passage of
American foreign policy towards Greek-Turkish conflict from one of "bucket brigade" to
real preventive diplomacy (Stearns, 1992). American interests in the area include
freedom of navigation, the health ofNATO, international trade and the ability to support
out-of-area operations. A reflection of American pragmatism is the desire to move
"beyond legal confines." (Schmitt, 1996)
The EU is anxious to include Cyprus as a healthy economy and a potential
outpost of European interests to the Middle East, but would rather live without it if it
meant importing to Brussels the well-known problems of Greek-Turkish cohabitation
within NATO. The attachment of Turkey as an open market is more important to the
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Resolution 939 (1994) of the UNSC ".. reaffirms its position that a Cypriot settlement must be based on a
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Europeans than any political or security services Turkey can offer now. The UN on its
part, has to cope with a long history of ineffectiveness and a continuous undermining of
the Secretary General's efforts. To its credit, one could mention the preservation of
peace in Cyprus for most of the time since the first deployment ofUNFICYP in 1964,
given its limited mandate. It would be wrong to assume however that stability in Cyprus
has any chance if the Turkish-Cypriot side continues to default on a permanent solution
for fear of losing the 1974 spoils in the face of an economically strong and determined
Cypriot State. In the meantime, Greek-Turkish crises continue to appear as the
underlying differences between the countries are not resolved. NATO, built on the
principle of unanimity, could not possibly resolve the issues of Greek-Turkish dispute,
though it could provide a forum for communication and consultation as well as crisis
control and confidence building as Stearns suggests. The institutional framework of any
Greek-Turkish understanding could not ignore the future realities ofNATO, WEU and
the European security identity.
On that background resolution strategies appear differentiated on where one
should start untying the Gordian knot. The Clinton administration seems to have adopted
a Cyprus-first approach according to some reports. Cyprus extends the conflict beyond
the Aegean waters, and poses greater risks for regional stability. After building some
level of trust in Cyprus, problems in the Aegean and NATO could be tackled. Cyprus is
of high symbolic significance and could act as a watershed.
Others on the contrary, such as Stearns, support the Aegean-first solution, leaving
Cyprus last, or in a parallel track after some confidence has been built. Steams puts
88
forward the question of "ripeness." Statements have been made lately for 1997 as
potentially the year of Cyprus resolution (The London Times. 25 October, 1996). There
are also those who support a package deal. It is for them considered more possible to
find ground for compromise in a multi-issue basket than in a single one. Cofoudakis
goes in the opposite direction and addresses Cyprus outside the narrow realm of Greek-
Turkish relations in accord with earlier "internationalization" approaches.
Undersecretary of State Korablum stressed the importance of flexibility in
achieving compromise. His proposal -important as coming from the lips of an acting
official in a US administration— is focused on a continuation of Turkish talks with the
EU, and the deference of Aegean problems to an arbitrating body, while a re-united
Cyprus remains a stated goal. A re-united Cyprus could well be another name for a
federated state with a constitutional structure supporting a three-level polity, which
would be difficult to implement as some journalistic reports suggest. As the Cypriot
Ambassador to the United States, Jacovides, writes:
We certainly welcome such engagement. What is lacking however, is the
political will and the flexibility necessary to make a breakthrough toward
a compromise solution on the part of Ankara, which has long held the key
to such a solution through its military, economic and political dominance
of the occupied northern part of Cyprus since 1974. (Washington Post , 9
September 1996)
All of these efforts aim to "overcome suspicions of the past and consolidate the
identity of Western culture." The issue of culture appears here both as a motive and a
reprimand. It is not clear, though, if the policy makers in Washington have a clear
understanding of what western culture means —outside the walls of their city- being
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born or raised in a culturally dominant society and not having to struggle for the survival
of their own culture. A-historical explanations such as Fukuyama's, and their corollary
policies, do not sit well in a region where identities have been forming for centuries.
Specific measures to manage the Greek-Turkish conflict include CSBM and
defense restructuring arrangements in the fashion of past US-Soviet experiences
(Constas, 1991). It is difficult to implement them because they lack political support,
and are not seen as promoting stability. A provocative statement or a violation of
airspace is enough to cancel any work done in that respect. However, the continuation of
a form of dialogue appears vital for any future success. At a more general level Stearns
proposes a NATO sanctioned pact of non-aggression negotiated by the two parties
themselves (Stearns, 1992). In the words of a US official: "locally determined,
internationally sanctioned."
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Analysis of complex phenomena such as crises is facilitated by breaking them
down into variables that reflect more accurately the research object (Lebow, 1981). Our
research focuses on the causes of the crises and on the relative success of mediation
efforts to contain them. Every crisis reviewed in Chapter II is broken down into the
issues that ignited the conflict and include an examination of the influence different
variables had on its outcome. Domestic political considerations, sources of
misperception, the international system and the specific politico-military realities relating
to each crisis have been examined. Lebow' s crisis typology is used to connect those
01
variables together for every crisis study . In attempting to identify the origins ofthe
reviewed Greek-Turkish crises one should be aware of a continuity of contentious issues.
Analysis of crises from 1955 until today could give us insight for the future of Greek-
Turkish conflict.
Our brief bibliographic review in Chapter III suggests two analytically extreme
causes for recurrent Greek-Turkish crises. The first explanation posits as the main cause
misperceptions held by decision makers reinforced by public images in both countries.




of mostly competing Greek-Turkish interests in the region. Our task becomes one of
relating the variables presented by the case studies to the explanations stated above. Our
initial hypothesis has been that Turkey's attempt to revise the status quo is the primary
cause of the crises.
The most important conclusion from our analysis is that all the crises, except one,
are what Lebow calls "brinkmanship crises."* " Brinkmanship crises develop when "a
state knowingly challenges an important commitment of another state in the hope of
compelling its adversary to back away from his commitment."(Lebow, 1981) Therefore,
brinkmanship crises are manageable, since they express rationally derived strategies and
they involve utilitarian calculations by the actors. Despite the large number of crises,
Greece and Turkey confronted each other in combat only once. This fact validates the
rational actor hypothesis, since it appears that for all decision makers involved war has a
greater cost than any potential benefits. With the exception of 1974, all crises show an
expectation on the part of the initiator to revise what is perceived as an unfavorable
condition through threats. The 1974 crisis has been analyzed from two different
perspectives. For the Turkish side, the Greek coup against Makarios was the origin of the
crisis, and Turkey intervened to restore peace. Not surprisingly, the Greek side
counterargues that Turkey exceeded its powers as a guarantor nation and should not have
undertaken the second offensive, especially after the Geneva talks. With the benefit of
hindsight and in view of subsequent Greek and Turkish policies on Cyprus, one can
82 A disclaimer is proper here. As Lebow remarks for his own analysis, "The assignation of a crisis to a
particular category depends upon an analysis of the initiator's objectives in the crisis, its leaders willingness
to go to war, and the degree of control they exercise over events. Interpretation of these criteria are likely
to vary from scholar to scholar regardless of the extent of available documentation." (Lebow, 1987: 24)
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safely classify the 1974 crisis as a "justification of hostility" type, where Turkish leaders
took the decision to escalate the crisis during negotiations, when a cease fire was
operational. Lebow's five-step seqience of events usually followed during an initiation
of hostilities crisis is a perfect fit for events in 1974 and could have been abstracted from
the events following the Greek coup. (Lebow, 1981)
2. Causes for the Crises
In Chapter IT, our definition of crisis included the perception of a high probability
of escalation to war. Crises are conceptually problematic when one tries to identify a
specific "crisis initiation" point in time, due to the close interrelation of events leading up
to the crisis. Since tensions are so frequent in Greek-Turkish affairs, that becomes even
more difficult. In our attempt to establish an objective criterion, we use the first instance
of use of force or the first explicit threat of such use as starting points of reviewed crises.
Under that criterion, Turkey has been the challenger in all crises with the exception of
the 1967 crisis. Turkish crisis initiations have always been related to events perceived as
threatening to vital Turkish security interests. This is an important element of our
analysis. Crises become the immediate result of perceptions for threatened security
interests. The definition of Turkish security interests, however, is built on the fluid
concept of "legality" and on a selective interpretation and implementation of
international law (see Chapter III). As the case crises suggest, Turkish security interests
in Cyprus and in the Aegean have expanded considerably over time. In 1955 Turkish
interests in Cyprus were expressed as a strong objection to any prospect of enosis. After
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1974, with the defacto partition of Cyprus crises there have not been frequent or intense.
The decision of the EU to commence accession talks with Cyprus in early 1998, has
initiated a new series of crises. In 1996 Turkey threatened full partition in the case of
Cypriot inclusion into the EU. The purchase of a defensive missile system by Cyprus in
1997 led to Turkish threats of a pre-emptive attack.
On the Aegean front, Turkish claims were non-existent until 1973. Since 1973
two serious crises have arisen related to continental shelf issues. Today, a causus belli is
operational in the Aegean in case Greece exercises its sovereign right to extend its
territorial sea to 12 nautical miles. In 1996, a crisis related to the sovereignty of a group
of islands in the South Eastern Aegean qualitatively expanded Turkish security interests
from a dispute over the delineation of maritime boundaries to sovereignty claims over
land.
Nonetheless, it was lack of political insight on behalf of the Greek government in
1955 to consider as viable any change in Cyprus against Turkish interests. The immediate
issue in the 1955 crisis was the contrast in social and economic status between the Greek
minority in Istanbul and the Turkish population. However, the timing of the Turkish
government-sponsored riots with the London Tripartite Conference of 1955 suggests that
the underlying cause of the crisis was the prospect of enosis between Cyprus and Greece.
In 1963, fear of a disadvantageous revision of the constitutional structure of the Cypriot
state that would deny Turkey effective access to Cypriot politics through the Turkish-
Cypriot community prompted Turkey to respond with threats and limited military action
against Cyprus. The immediate cause in that case was intra-communal conflict and the
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security of the Turkish-Cypriot minority. In 1967 —the only crisis Greece initiated—
immediate causes point to domestic political benefits for the Athens junta. To search for
underlying causes for the junta's actions both in 1967 and 1974 is to give credit for
strategic planning where it is not due. It would be correct to assume that eventual
unification of Cyprus with Greece was a perceived objective in the 1967 crisis, but in
1974 the coup was directed against Makarios personally.
After 1974, there was an extension of immediate causes to include disputes in the
Aegean. In all post- 1974 crises the status quo of the Aegean has been in some form the
underlying cause of the crises. For both countries the Aegean has acquired symbolic
importance besides any economic or strategic considerations. Specifically for Greece,
the Aegean is seen as an entity with cultural and historic, as well as economic and
strategic dimensions. From the Byzantine era, the ruler of the Aegean Sea became the
ruler of the Greek mainland. If Turkey follows the lebensraum strategic tradition, Greece
cannot acquiesce in a loss of its own vital space. It follows that
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issues such as national
pride and status should also be considered alongside legal or strategic considerations in
any conflict management attempt. In real terms, Turkey expresses a "fear of entrapment"
to justify its claims. It is not a credible argument, since Turkey already enjoys wide
access to the Mediterranean and will continue to do so even with a 12-mile Greek
territorial sea, due to the transit passage regime (Schmitt, 1996). Furthermore, Turkey
has not encountered any Greek-imposed constraints on freedom of navigation, similar to
those it imposes on the Dardanelle Straits.
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The basis of the Turkish claims in the Aegean is the political concept of equity, as
the 1976 and 1987 crises suggest. Greek policy views the Aegean as organically linked
with mainland Greece. The Greek islands in the Aegean are not self-sufficient
economically, and depend for energy and services such as health care and administration
on mainland Greece. They are strategically vulnerable. Any Turkish action which would
potentially undercut the unity of Greek space is justifiably considered a threat. Issues
ranging from operational command and control arrangements ofNATO forces in the
Aegean to search and rescue responsibilities acquire a political significance which goes
against practicality. The Greek and Turkish positions on the Aegean constitute a zero-
sum game which fuels continual crises.
If the underlying causes of the crises are found in conflicting interests, the
immediate causes have to be sought in the domestic politics and the perceptions held by
both countries. The outcomes of reviewed crises were influenced by them as well. In
1974, hostilities were not the immediate result of Turkish political revisionism since that
had been present at least since 1955. Hostilities came as a result of the absence of a
credible Greek deterrent and the presence of a legal argument for intervention. In 1976,
the Turkish government deliberately initiated a crisis over exploration rights in the
Aegean under internal political pressure. The crisis underscored Turkish plans to share
the Aegean. The escalating Greek response came after strong debates in Parliament
where the opposition called for a sinking of the Turkish vessel. The 1987 crisis arose out
of a Turkish misperception of Greek intentions. While the Greek government
nationalized the company responsible for oil explorations in the Aegean to avoid an
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inadvertent crisis provoked by the company's publicized intention to conduct drillings in
the continental shelf outside Greek territorial waters, Turkey viewed it as a clear
indication of Greek assertiveness, and thus damaging for Turkish interests. The crisis
was not avoided even though technically there was no capability for oil drilling for at
least six more months.
The question of underlying and immediate causes cannot be answered effectively
ifwe do not identity the different levels on which the Greek -Turkish conflict resides. As
the crises suggest, we observe conflicting national interests between Greece and Turkey.
But this realization is inadequate. In the final analysis conflict arises from a different
cosmology —how both countries view the world— and a conflicting ontology —what role
every country reserves for itself. Core goals and values as well as national interests are in
contrast. Greece has a western orientation, its society focuses on the individual and civic
liberties are respected to a degree commonly found among western European nations.
Greece furthermore does not aspire to the role of a regional power, despite it being the
most politically and economically stable Balkan nation. Turkey, in contrast, although
strategically committed to the West since Ataturk, is characterized by a troubled
democracy, an authoritarian society, and serious human rights violations. Turkey's
regional power aspirations have consistently troubled many of its neighbors, including
Greece, a NATO ally. This becomes more apparent as we analyze the politics and
perceptions that have shaped every crisis.
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3. Politics and Misperception
Politics in both countries have intensified the underlying causes of the conflict,
and made conflict resolution difficult. Political considerations in crises include: Turkish
policies of national identity, nationalistic inflammatory policies promoted by both sides,
and Turkish political instability coupled with a not-so-open society. In 1923, Kemal built
the new Turkish state on the basis of an ethnic Turkish identity. To preserve Turkish
national integrity other identities were suppressed. The politics of national identity in
Turkey exercised a deleterious effect on the 1955 crisis, with the Istanbul pogroms. In
1963, the Greek minority in Istanbul had many of its members deported as retaliatory
tactics for events in Cyprus. Even as late as 1987 the issue of property rights for the
Greek minority in Turkey was the subject of post-crisis negotiations, and shows the
minimal real progress made over the years. Minority related issues represent deep-rooted
differences in values. The Muslim minority in Thrace and the remnants of a once vibrant
Greek community in Istanbul do not pose an immediate threat to regional stability . But
in a conflict where issues are easily linked they can become political liabilities for an
eventual resolution, as the 1963 case study shows.
The 1967 crisis reflects the effect nationalistic domestic policies have had on
crises. The Greek junta, trying to muster domestic support, apparently authorized or
acquiesced in an ill-fated para-military campaign in Cyprus professing nationalistic
ideals. Makarios was not even consulted, and the crisis ended with humiliating terms for
the Greek side, including the withdrawal of the Greek regiment in Cyprus, which had
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It is protected as a "Muslim minority" after the Treaty of Laussane. Muslims in Thrace are either ethnic
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been stationed there after the 1963-4 crisis. Greek political instability until 1974 did not
help resolve crises in Cyprus and denied Greece the coercive power to pursue a more
independent foreign policy. The 1974 defacto partition of Cyprus changed the security
setting so that domestic political realities in Athens became irrelevant to issues in
Cyprus. An advanced degree of democratic consolidation also minimized drastic
changes on Greek foreign policy as governments succeeded one another. As the 1976
and 1987 crises suggest, political differences among Greek parties became differences of
means and not of ends.
Since 1970, the domestic scene in Turkey has played a more dominant role in the
conflict. The ascendance of new classes with differentiated interests has created tensions
between the Turkish Armed Forces and the political establishment. In 1976, a weak
Turkish government adopted a nationalistic position on the continental shelf issue and
withdrew the previously accepted appeal to the International Court. In 1987 Ozal was
faced with internal domestic and bureaucratic pressures to discontinue the Davos
process. Similar pressures were exerted in Greece on Papandreou. The recent
ascendance to power of the Islamic Welfare Party creates one more source of domestic
political tension with possible repercussions in Greek-Turkish relations and regional
stability, since nationalistic policies are widely perceived as a safe method to gain
popular support. The lack of an open society in Turkey presents another challenge for
stability in the area. Public support is considered given for matters of foreign policy and
state authority is not questioned. In 1987 Turkish actions were not debated domestically,
Turks or Pomaks. Turkey refers consistently to the minority as a "Turkish minority."
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while the Greek government had to explain escalation to a heated Parliament and a
politically sensitive public.
However domestic political realities have not changed either Greek or Turkish
foreign policy goals. Even as governments have succeeded one another, crises show the
prevalence of security-military over political-economic approaches to the conflict. The
continuity in expressed Turkish security interests in the Aegean and Cyprus and the
Greek security doctrine which recognizes a threat to the East make supporting the
misperception thesis difficult to sustain at the conflict cause level. Misperceptions have
arisen in the past but cannot be classified as the sources of Greek-Turkish conflict. In
1955 the Greek government did not realize the degree of Turkish interest in Cyprus, but it
is doubtful if such a realization would have stopped the initiation of the struggle for
enosis, given the strong popular support. In 1963 Turkey had a misperception about the
American commitment to its defense but was correct in judging Makarios's thirteen
points as in effect minimizing Turkish influence on Cypriot affairs. In 1967 the military
junta in Athens did not contemplate a Turkish forcible response, yet its dual policy of
undermining Makarios and nationalistic hyperbole created another crisis in 1974 despite
the lessons of 1967. In 1987 Turkish misperceptions of Greek intentions validated
Turkish interests for a revision of the Aegean status quo. Perceptions are not limited to
the countries involved but are extended to mediators as well. Discontent with American
reactions to the conflict came from all sides at some point and damaged US credibility
for impartiality over both sides of the Aegean. In 1974 Greeks expected an allied
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intervention to restore order in Cyprus and constrain Turkey, especially after the second
part of the Turkish attack.
Misperceptions come at different levels and acquire different amounts of
significance at every level for successful conflict resolution. Lebow identifies three
possible sources of misperception: bureaucratic misperceptions originating from the
decision making process, situational misperceptions arising from the political context,
and perspective misperceptions relating to images of oneself, images of the other and
images of the other's image of oneself. For Greek-Turkish crises perspective
misperceptions have been the most important even as situational or bureaucratic
misperceptions have been present as well. For the 1955 case, situational and perspective
perceptions were involved in relating events in Cyprus with the Greek minority in
Istanbul. Perspective misperceptions about the "evil Greek" permeated a willing public
and led to the extensive riots. In 1974, Greek bureaucratic misperceptions of the possible
Turkish reaction to the planned coup against Makarios led to the disastrous decision. The
decision making process was seriously impaired by the absence of any opposition to
Ioannide's authoritative rule. Turkish perceptions of a demonstrated Greek unwillingness
to fight in 1963 and 1967 facilitated the decision to launch the Cyprus "peace
operations." In 1987 the Turkish bureaucracy did not expect the forceful Greek protest
and Ozal was at pains to persuade his military for a withdrawal.
What appears common in all cases is the a priori codification of any action by the
other country as at least suspicious. The 1987 crisis clearly shows an inclination of the
Turkish side to assign bad intentions to a Greek action which clearly aimed in avoiding
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crises. The Greek side has similarly assigned symbolic value to other incidents, making
them harder to de-escalate (e.g. the 1996 crisis). In all cases there is the perception of an
adversary. It is based in recent as well as past history. This strong perspective is not
necessarily a misperception. After so many instances of adversarial relationships it
would be myopic to outright reject Greek-Turkish animosity as arising out of outmoded
and hawkish misperceptions. Misperceptions are part of the conflict as they have
become institutionalized. As Mitchell writes: "Conflict attitudes and perceptions are
assumed to be factors arising through the stresses of being in a conflict, rather than
factors fundamentally causing conflicts, although extreme conflict attitudes involving
hostility, misperceptions and dehumanisation of the opposing party will obviously
exacerbate any dispute. Furthermore, it is undoubtedly the case that previous experience
of a conflict will leave residual elements of prejudice and hostility to affect future
behavior, and these may become contributory sources of future disputes." (Mitchell,
1994) For example, the 1955 crisis showed the effect the "Cretan syndrome" had in
Turkish foreign policy84 . However, if conflictual interests would not have been present
such animosities would be easy to overcome through normal political and other
exchanges of proper neighborly relations.
84
It was named after Crete's transfer to Greece at the beginning of the twentieth century. The Turks have
partly explained the demise of the Ottoman empire by demonizing the "evil Greek."
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4. Context of Crises
The crises under review suggest that the international and regional realities, as
well as domestic politics within the US, have had their own effect on Greek-Turkish
crises. They appeared when relations among the superpowers were not extremely
tenuous. The 1955 crisis came after Stalin's death, an event related by some analysts to
the pogroms, as the case study suggests. In 1963 and 1967, the cold war had given way
to what would be later called detente. In 1974, the Soviet Union did not interfere beyond
verbal condemnation.
Greek-Turkish crises were also easier to contain when both countries faced a
common enemy. The 1955 crisis shows a remarkable subjugation of Greek interests to
the allied cause. The 1963 and 1967 cases reflect a period when allied or American
concerns presided over Greek or Turkish national sensitivities. For example, in 1964 the
Johnson letter came two months after the first indication of a permanent Soviet
deployment in the Mediterranean. Containment of the crises at those times had been
immediate and successful. In contrast, relaxation of tensions between US and Soviet
Union/Russia resulted in an increase in Greek-Turkish crises. Alliance cohesion
mattered less for Greek and Turkish policy makers than did national security agendas.
Foreign policy choices by both countries were possible without immediate external
coercion. The effect US domestic politics have had on the Greek-Turkish conflict is
exemplified in the 1974 crisis. In 1974, the Watergate scandal, an internal re-
organization of State Department regional desks, and the Arab-Israeli crisis demanded
more resources from American diplomacy than were available to successfully contain the
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Cyprus crisis. Lack of coordination and Kissinger's personal conduct of foreign policy
seem to have been the main causes for the American failure. In 1987, the US chose not
to intervene drastically as it had done for the crises of 1964 and 1967, and NATO's
Secretary General, Lord Carrington, undertook the role of mediator with successful
results.
Political-military realities during crises point to the primacy of the local against
the general balance of power between Greece and Turkey. In 1963 and in 1987, the local
balance of power was reflected in the crisis outcome, but 1967 is a deviation. Even as
Greeks enjoyed local superiority, the colonels' decision to refrain from action show the
effect misperceptions have had on the outcome of the crisis. In 1974, the readiness of
Greek Armed Forces at the time was generally questionable and the local balance of
power did not represent any great departure from the general one. Another related
continuity in Greek-Turkish crises has been the focused use of military forces. Even if
political issues are complex, military means are used during crises to support selected
objectives which represent the immediate causes of the crisis. In the cases studied a
generalized war did not occur even when units by both countries were involved in intense
maneuvering. Horizontal dispersion of the crises has been minimal if not absent. It is
one more argument for the rational approach by decision makers in both sides of the
Aegean, and a hopeful sign for the management of the conflict.
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B. CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND MEDIATION EFFECTIVENESS
To understand and evaluate crisis management efforts adopted by third parties we
resort to a comparison of undertaken policies and initiatives with ideal management
proposals made by Alexander George. George differentiates between political and
operational principles for crisis management (George, 1991). Political principles are: (1)
limitation of objectives and (2) limitation of means employed on behalf of those
objectives. Operational principles include: (1) political authorities must maintain
informed control over military options; (2) the tempo of military maneuvers should allow
for effective crisis communication and decision making; (3) movements of military
forces have to be carefully coordinated with diplomatic actions; (4) use and threat of use
of force should be consistent with the diplomatic objectives; (5) security spirals should
be avoided; (6) diplomatic-military options that are consistent with a desire to negotiate
should be chosen and (7) the opponent should be left a way out of the conflict.
Political principles for sound crisis management have been followed in Greek-
Turkish crises. That fact supports the view that the conflict is controllable. Of the crises
reviewed here, only the 1974 case resulted in open hostilities between Greek and
Turkish forces. Before 1974, specifically in 1963 and 1967, the Greek lack of political
control over military forces in Cyprus resulted in crisis escalation, but in both cases
generalized war was avoided. However, the political objectives which constitute the basis
for the conflict have expanded through the years. In 1955, the Turkish political objective
was the denial of a change in Cyprus' s status favorable to Greece and conflicting with
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Turkish security interests. In 1963 the Turkish political objective was to consolidate its
position in Cyprus and avoid a constitutional change. The 1 967 crisis is different since
Greeks initiated the crisis. In 1974 Turkey's political objectives were the partition of
Cyprus. The 1976 and 1987 crises reflected the Turkish political objective of
challenging the Aegean status quo. Some analysts have viewed the 1976 crisis as a
Turkish attempt to pre-empt the European Community against accepting Greece as a full
member. The association council for reviewing the Greek case was scheduled for mid-
July 1976, when the crisis broke out (Constas, 1991, p.209). A similar strategy seems to
be employed by Turkey in the case of Cyprus in 1997. In 1996, Greek sovereignty over
Aegean islands was effectively challenged, even as a return to the status quo ante was
pronounced after the crisis. Political objectives have been constant for Greece since
1955, despite the major change in strategic realities after 1974. The recent Greek-
Cypriot "unified defense doctrine" (see Chapter III) is an attempt to reverse those
strategic realities. Operational crisis management principles have been generally
followed after 1974, again supporting the argument that Greek-Turkish conflict arises out
of rational utility calculations. The conflict is expressed mostly through brinkmanship
crises, therefore it is potentially manageable. The security spiral however, has not been
avoided. There is an ongoing arms race between Greece and Turkey with disastrous
effects for both economies. Per capita Greek and Turkish defense expenditures are the
highest in NATO.
Characteristics of national strategies followed during crises display important
continuities. Turkey has initiated most of the crises and has explicitly "drawn the line"
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of its interests every time. Turkey has also shown a greater propensity to use or threaten
to use force. Greece has largely followed a deterrent strategy, attempting to balance its
lack of power with outside guarantees and interventions. Greece since 1955 has
connected NATO participation and commitments with implicit security guarantees
against Turkey, even though the Washington Treaty does not offer a basis for such
guarantees. Who would have thought in 1948 that allies have to be protected from each
other? In 1955, more as a protest, Greece withdrew its forces from NATO Headquarters
in Izmir. The same tactic was followed in 1974, when Greece withdrew from the
Military Command Structure, a largely symbolic gesture with consequences both for
Greece and the Alliance. Since 1974, Greek reliance on external forces has been limited,
as the 1987 crisis suggests; however Greece continuously searches for political
commitments supporting its position in the conflict. Negotiations after crises have
always been proposed by Turkey, only in the form of bilateral negotiations instead of
arbitration through an international body such as the International Court, which is the
Greek position. Greece, by declining to participate in bilateral negotiations is blamed for
intransigence.
The strategies adopted depend on each country's perspective, and could give
some support for the misperception thesis. Turkey in the crises of 1963, 1967, 1974 and
1987 viewed Greek actions as/aits accomplis against Turkish security interests.
Turkey's own actions therefore were considered as coercive diplomacy against a
threatening neighbor. With the exception of 1967, Greek actions have been at the
political level and did not involve the use of force or the threat of such use. If there was
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a perceived provocation there have always been open diplomatic channels between the
two countries (even in 1974) to resolve such differences. Turkey by directly escalating
legal issues to crises has consistently attempted to de-legalize the issues and promote a
political settlement which is favorable to Turkey as it reflects power status
considerations.
Greece views Turkey's actions either asfaits accomplis (1974), blackmail {causus
belli, Cypriot accession to EU) or as controlled pressure (1955, 1963, 1987). Its own
actions are perceived as parts of a general deterrent strategy, drawing lines and conveying
commitment. Use of coercive diplomacy has been minimal despite lip service paid to it.
In 1955, verbal protests were made to demand a rather symbolic compensation for the
extent of material damages made. In 1963 Greek planes did not engage Turkish fighters
over Cyprus. In 1967 Greek forces did not participate in action despite their local
superiority. This fact has not been unnoticed by the Turkish side and in 1974 Turkish
planners evaluated negatively Greek willingness to fight. In 1974, as if to support such
estimations, Greek submarines were recalled from patrols near Cyprus probably to avoid
any generalization of the conflict. In 1976 the Greek side did agree by the Bern Protocol
to "avoid any provocation." In 1987, Greece accepted bilateral talks despite earlier
positions against conducting bilateral talks with Turkey before Turkey withdrew its
occupation forces from Cyprus. The 1996 crisis poses questions about the extent to
which the Greek side is ready to commit its forces during a confrontation. Since Greece
has adopted a deterrence strategy —immediate for the Aegean and extended for Cyprus-
it is important for its success to show a willingness to use force when the line has been
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crossed. Attempting to increase its deterrent capability Greece has always vied for
political support of its position from third parties and organizations. Some analysts
contend that Greek policy is not limited to deterrence, since it seeks a reversal of the
situation in Cyprus. However, even the more limited, deterrent part of the strategy
appears problematic since there is a dichotomy between Greek rhetoric and Greek
practice in defending the status quo. This is rationally explained through a comparison
of utilities between the status quo and any prospect of military action. Nonetheless, it
creates conditions for an unmanageable situation, since the deterrent is not operational.
Rogers has classified crisis bargaining codes in four basic categories (George,
1991). He examines "three pivotal crisis bargaining issues: (1) an image of the
adversary, including beliefs about the adversary's typical objectives, decision making
style, and typical bargaining strategy; (2) an image of crisis dynamics, including beliefs
about the nature of crisis escalation and the manner in which a war might erupt in a
crisis; and (3) general beliefs about the optimal mixture and timing of coercion,
accommodation, and persuasion in an overall bargaining strategy." (George, 1991, p.415)
Even as crisis bargaining codes are highly context-dependent since they depend on
specific personalities and decision processes, we identify in Greek-Turkish crises more
type B-II bargaining codes than others from both sides. Greek and Turkish decision
makers appear aware of the political dimensions of the crisis, they have a high degree of
confidence that inadvertent escalation can be prevented, and they occasionally include a
carrot in their crisis bargaining strategy. However, they still favor coercion as early as
possible, to the extent of committing/aits accomplis. Crisis management with B-II
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bargaining types from both sides of the dividing line becomes more predictable since
both sides assign primary importance to a rational estimation of the situation. Despite
the predictability, such encounters are explosive due to the over-reliance on military
means, especially to their pre-emptive use.
Mediation efforts have been successful in avoiding imminent crises, although
without resolving the underlying causes for the conflict. The United States has
consistently been the provider of mediation services between the two countries. Its
mediation strategy could be characterized as power mediation with implicit or explicit
threats accompanying the proposed solutions, especially before 1974. The European
Union is seen as a partial and biased entity by Turkey since Greece is one of its members.
However, the EU is in a unique political position to provide mediation services,
especially if Turkey continues to pursue its policy of Europeanization . The United
Nations has provided peacekeeping personnel in Cyprus continuously since 1964. NATO
has not been able to resolve any differences between the two countries, even those
originating within the alliance, perhaps due to its unanimity constraint in decision
making. Several characteristics for past mediation efforts become apparent after analysis
of the crises reviewed.
Mediation efforts have had as their goal regional stability without due regard to
specific Greek or Turkish national interests. This had been more pronounced in crises
before 1974. Short-term stability was secured in all crises, with 1974 being the important
35
After the 1987 crisis, in 1988 the European Parliament adopted a resolution calling upon EPC (European
Political Cooperation) to put pressure on the Turkish government, which is linked to the European
Community by an association agreement and is an applicant for full membership, to draw up a precise
timetable for the withdrawal of its troops and that of the Turkish settlers from Cyprus
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exception. However, stability came with the US maintaining an equidistant policy from
both Greece and Turkey. Given the revisionist nature of the conflict, stability is not
synonymous with equilibrium . There is a qualitative difference between the two which
represents conflict dynamics. Crises have shown the expansion of Turkish political
objectives. If at all crises the mediator adopts equal distances from conflicting parties,
over time the median position will be closer to the initial position of the actor continually
expanding his agenda, even as crisis management would have been successful for
separate crises.
Power mediation in 1963 and 1967 helped both parties realize the potential for
losses from a continued crisis, and has forcefully underlined the need for stability in the
region. Despite the nature of mediation, the 1974, 1976, and 1987 crises showed the
limited effect the US has had on the course of events during crises. Mediation has to take
another form to induce both parties to identify potential gains from a revision of their
contemporary zero-sum strategies. Keashly and Fisher propose a contingency model for
successful third-party intervention, which takes into account the stage of the conflict and
a continuous intervention by utilizing a succession of intervention techniques appropriate
for the situation. A brief table of available intervention options is shown as Table 3:
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It is reminded that disequilibrium is considered as "change beyond the threshold of reversibility." Stability




Discussion Coalition (assist communication) Negotiation (settle interests)
Polarization Consultation (improve relations) Pure mediation (settle interests)
Segregation Arbitration, Power mediation (control hostility) Consultation (improve relations)
Destruction Peacekeeping (control violence) Arbitration, Consultation, Development aid
Table 3. Contingency model of intervention. Adapted from Bercovitch, 1996, p.245
In the Greek-Turkish case, there seems to be a need for arbitration before any
power mediation effort addresses the control of hostilities, since the conflict has already
reached the segregation phase. The crises discussed here suggest a dynamic in the
conflict which is beyond the immediate short-term effects of power mediation even if
they appear successful.
Boundary setting has for a long time been considered a safe method of
establishing security guarantees and is the concept upon which the current international
system of nation states operates. To address the underlying causes of Greek-Turkish
conflict a set of principled, internationally-sanctioned "guaranteed boundaries" seems
necessary to allow both countries to re-examine their threat calculations.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
The reviewed crises suggest the presence of different immediate and underlying
causes. The underlying cause ofthe Greek-Turkish conflict is a set of incompatible
interests in the Aegean and Cyprus. Those interests are defined in relation to one another
in what becomes a zero-sum competition for primacy in a volatile and complex
geopolitical region. Turkey, following its ascending regional status since 1955, has made
steady effort to revise the situation established in the region by the treaties of Laussane,
Montreux, and Paris. Crises reveal political goals --clearly stated by Turkey— which are
supportive of such a revision. The appearance ofAegean disputes after 1973 and the
gradual transformation of Turkish political objectives in Cyprus, as exemplified in the
crises before and after 1974, testify to the continuity of Turkish revisionism.
Beyond the existence of underlying causes of conflict in Greek-Turkish relations,
there exists a set ofphenomena and processes such as crises initiations, crises
management and crises outcome which is directly related to the immediate causes of the
conflict. Immediate causes include changes in the international or regional system,
domestic politics, institutionalized perceptions of animosity, and the local balance of
power, as well as crisis-dependent politico-military considerations. The inclusion of
immediate causes becomes necessary if one attempts to explain the difference in
outcomes of crises, given the continuities in political objectives.
Therefore, competition between Greece and Turkey exists in multiple
dimensions, qualifying the "real" interest-based conflict. Cultural differences and the
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separate historical developments of the respective polities have resulted in state and
societal structures which hold different values. On the other hand, both countries shared
common allies and enemies for a long time, a condition resulting in security
arrangements which brought them closer together. In reality, the history of Greek-
Turkish crises seems to be the history of competitive centrifugal national interests and
centripetal alliance or multilateral commitments. Mediation attempts have played an
important role in Greek-Turkish crises by attempting to reinforce those centripetal
commitments, at least since 1955.
However, mediation has focused more on the immediate causes of the crises,
because the intended outcome of mediation attempts has been regional stability instead
of Greek-Turkish conflict management. Power mediation has been successful
nonetheless, given that rationality eventually prevailed on both sides of the Aegean. All
crises except the one that resulted in combat in 1974 can be categorized as brinkmanship
crises. The defusion of each crisis though, did not ameliorate animosities. The
underlying causes of the conflict have been largely ignored, reflecting the ad hoc and
reactive nature of all mediations. Since 1974, and especially since 1987, the growing
involvement of the European Community (now European Union) in the conflict allows
for some optimism. Political-economic considerations may well achieve primacy over
strict strategic-military ones if a contingency model for conflict management is followed.
Such a model provides for power mediation to avoid or contain hostilities but most
important is complemented by a series of measures to resolve the deeper, underlying
causes of conflictual behavior.
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As a final note, we should stress the potential for failure and its implications in
managing Greek-Turkish conflict. Past crises show us the basically rational character of
both Greek and Turkish decision makers. The potential for conflict escalation however,
should be related to utility calculations involving the status quo as well as to the potential
gains and losses for each country in different scenarios. Experience since 1955 shows
that both countries, when their national interest dictated, did not hesitate to confront
NATO or US policies. The future ofNATO, US Balkan and Middle Eastern policies,
and European security and foreign policy interests are more assured with a Greek-
Turkish rapprochement. The question of "how" can only be answered by a holistic view
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